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THE JUST PROSECUTOR
BRANDON HASBROUCK*
ABSTRACT
As the most powerful actors in our criminal legal system, prosecutors
have been and remain one of the principal drivers of mass incarceration.
This was and is by design. Prosecutorial power derives from our
constitutional structure—prosecutors are given almost unfettered
discretion to determine who to charge, what to charge, and, often, what the
sentence will be. Within that structure, the prosecutor’s duty is to ensure
that justice is done. Yet, in exercising their outsized power, some
prosecutors have fully embraced a secondary, adversarial role as a partisan
advocate at the significant cost of seeking justice.
The necessary reforms of our carceral system must begin with the
prosecutor. Our adversarial system of justice so compellingly turns
prosecutors away from doing justice to maximizing convictions that it can
seem impossible to be both a good person and a good prosecutor. When
even progressive prosecutors can be turned into win-seekers rather than
neutral agents of justice, Blackness is punished. Black people are
disproportionally arrested, charged, convicted, and sentenced for longer
than the population overall. Rejecting adversarialism is therefore essential,
but that alone will not be enough—in order to act in the interest of justice,
a prosecutor must consciously replace adversarialism as a guiding
ideology.
This Article imagines prosecutors as solely just actors in our criminal
legal system. The prosecutor’s function as a minister of justice remains
underexamined and undertheorized. So, what is a just prosecutor? My thesis
is that abolition constitutionalism, critical originalism, and the liberation
justice of hip-hop and the Movement for Black Lives can be used in
constructing a prosecutor that improves the ideology and administration of
justice in the United States. Abolition constitutionalism demands that
prosecutors advance civil liberties, equal protection, and due process rights
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for criminal defendants throughout the entire criminal process. For
example, prosecutors should provide Brady exculpatory material to
defendants prior to entering any plea agreements and join a prisoner’s postconviction motion when they are actually innocent of the underlying crime.
Critical originalism confirms that the criminalization of the use of drugs
was driven by racial considerations and requires that prosecutors leverage
statutes, such as the Speedy Trial Act, to create robust diversion programs
for non-violent drug offenders. And prosecutors that understand liberation
justice appreciate that our system was designed to target and imprison
Black and Brown people. Because of this profound unfairness, prosecutors
must become movement lawyers who work to dismantle white supremacy
through decriminalization of drug offenses, prosecutorial nullification,
expungement motions, and the elimination of cash bail. There is much
common ground in these seemingly disparate threads of theory, where
justice is painted—not in definitional words, but in concrete actions—for
prosecutors.
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Rule-following, legal precedence, and political consistency are not more
important than right, justice and plain commonsense.
–W.E.B. Du Bois1
INTRODUCTION
The prosecutor’s role in our criminal legal system has recently reignited
a national conversation about race, identity, and criminal justice.2 For good
reason. The Netflix miniseries “When They See Us” underscores
1.
W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 299 (1935).
2.
See, e.g., Bethonie Butler, ‘When They See Us’ prompts renewed backlash for former
prosecutor Linda Fairstein, WASH. POST (June 4, 2019, 6:00 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/arts-entertainment/2019/06/04/when-they-see-us-prompts-renewed-backlash-former-prosecutor-lind
a-fairstein/ [https://perma.cc/Y6JS-ACEH].
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prosecutors’ direct involvement in the wrongful conviction of the
“Exonerated Five” (formerly the “Central Park Five”)—five Black and
Latino teenagers—for the assault and rape of a white woman jogging in
Central Park.3 The prosecutors, despite lacking DNA evidence linking any
of the five teenagers to the crime, obtained coerced confessions that resulted
in their convictions.4 After spending years in prison, DNA evidence from a
man who confessed to the attack vindicated all five innocent men.5 Then
there is “Time: The Kalief Browder Story,” a documentary that provides an
historical account on how Kalief Browder—a Black high-school student
accused of stealing a backpack—was detained on Rikers Island for three
years, two of which were in solitary confinement, without being tried or
convicted. 6 The prosecutors, with no direct or circumstantial evidence,
repeatedly delayed Browder’s trial, requesting—on several occasions—
more time to prepare for trial because “[t]he People [were] not ready.”7
Browder raised concerns with the trial court about prosecutorial abuse,
stating, “These guys are just playing with my case.”8 In the documentary,
Browder discusses the trauma and mental anguish he endured in prison
awaiting trial. Two years after the charges were dropped, Browder
committed suicide at his mother’s home.9

3.
See
Ava
DuVernay,
When
They
See
Us,
NETFLIX
(2019),
https://www.netflix.com/title/80200549; see also Aisha Harris, The Central Park Five: ‘We Were Just
Baby Boys,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/arts/television/whenthey-see-us.ht ml# [https://perma.cc/52QJ-U4FS] (providing an overview of the case).
4.
See Saul Kassin, False Confessions and The Jogger Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2002), https://
www.nytimes.com/2002/11/01/opinion/false-confessions-and-the-jogger-case.html?module=inline [htt
ps://perma.cc/9E6V-XJN7] (detailing the prosecutors’ involvement in coercing confessions); Lara
Bazelon, Linda Fairstein’s Central Park Five role is a case study for restorative justice, L.A. TIMES
(June 7, 2019, 3:10 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-bazelon-fairstein-central-parkfive-restor ative-justice-20190607-story.html (documenting lead prosecutor Linda Fairsetin’s admission
that she personally oversaw interrogation of the teens and boasting that she was “the 800-pound-gorilla”
in the room).
5.
See Ron Stodghill, True Confession of The Central Park Rapist, TIME MAG. (Dec. 9, 2002),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,397521,00.html [https://perma.cc/484F-LJVA]
(“Matias Reyes, a convicted murderer and rapist serving a 33-years-to-life sentence, confessed that he
alone had raped the jogger. Citing new DNA evidence that corroborated Reyes’ involvement in the crime
and noting discrepancies in the earlier confessions, Manhattan district attorney Robert Morgenthau last
week asked a judge to throw out the convictions of the five men.”).
6.
See Jenner Furst, Julia Willoughby Nason & Nick Sandow, Time: The Kalief Browder Story,
NETFLIX (2017), https://www.netflix.com/title/8018 7052.
7.
See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law: A Boy Was Accused of Taking a Backpack. The
Courts Took the Next Three Years of His Life, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law
[https://perma.cc/5EBM-792S]
(providing transcript of the prosecutor’s request to delay trial).
8.
Id.
9.
See Benjamin Weiser, Kalief Browder’s Suicide Brought Changes to Rikers. Now It Has Led
to a $3 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/nyregion/
kalief-browder-settlement-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/WT46-6SZH].
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These are just two of many tragic examples that demonstrate the power
and abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Both cases illustrate that any efforts
at meaningful systemic criminal justice reform must start with the
prosecutor. 10 As the most powerful actors in our criminal legal system,
prosecutors have been and remain one of the principal drivers of mass
incarceration.11 President Barack Obama, in the first ever law-review article
by a sitting president, acknowledged this, stating that research shows “the
important role prosecutors have played in escalating the length of sentences
and can play in easing them.”12
Prosecutors derive their power from our constitutional structure—
prosecutors are given almost unfettered discretion under the separation-ofpowers principle to determine who to charge, what to charge, and, often,
what the sentence will be.13 Within that structure, the prosecutor’s duty is
to ensure that justice is done. 14 The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this
foundational principle on many occasions, stating that the government’s
interest “in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.” 15 Yet, in exercising their outsized power, many
prosecutors have fully embraced a secondary, adversarial role as a partisan
advocate at the significant cost of seeking justice.16
10.
While the examples above both concern prosecutorial abuses in New York City, the problem
is national in scope. See Innocence Project, Exonerate the Innocent, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/exonerate/ [https://perma.cc/M37N-2J54] (“To date, 375 people in
the United States have been exonerated by DNA testing, including 21 who served time on death row.”).
11.
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 87 (2010) (“One might think that judges are the most powerful, or even the police,
but in reality the prosecutor holds the cards. It is the prosecutor . . . who holds the keys to the jailhouse
door.”); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 206 (2017) (contending that unregulated prosecutors are “the engines driving
mass incarceration”); Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xiii
n.69 (2015) (stating that “prosecutors—more than cops, judges, or legislators—[are] the principal
drivers of the increase in the prison population” (quoting Jeffrey Toobin, The Milwaukee Experiment:
What Can One Prosecutor Do About The Mass Incarceration of African-Americans?, NEW YORKER
(May 11, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/the-milwaukee-experiment)).
12.
Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform,
130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 824–825 n.53 (2017).
13.
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“This broad discretion rests largely
on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.”);
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to
believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).
14.
See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71 (2011) (“The role of a prosecutor is to see
that justice is done.”).
15.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
16.
The literature on American prosecutors suggest that this view is commonly held. See, e.g.,
MARK BAKER, D.A.: PROSECUTORS IN THEIR OWN WORDS 78–79, 82 (1999); id. at 79 (“It really came
down ultimately to getting a plea or winning a trial so I could go home that day and say, ‘Okay, I won
today. That game is over.”’); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 111 (1978) (“What the new prosecutor is taught is
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Stakeholders have recognized this shift and the necessity of reform, as
prosecutors play a critical role in our modern-day carceral state. Many
prominent scholars have called for independent oversight committees to
police prosecutors, 17 and for the election of progressive and Black
prosecutors to address racial and economic disparities in our system. 18
Some, such as Professor Rachel E. Barkow, contend that these measures
would result in institutional changes and serve as a fundamental check on
prosecutorial decisionmaking. 19 Others disagree. They have argued that
good people should not be prosecutors as the system has leaned away from
doing justice to maximizing convictions.20 As one former prosecutor stated,
“Becoming a prosecutor to help resolve unfairness in the criminal legal
system is like enlisting in the army because you are opposed to the current
war.”21
The adversary system derails many prosecutors, including progressive
prosecutors, and turns them into win-seekers instead of neutral agents of
justice.22 The pressure to win presents an insurmountable obstacle for many
prosecutors who are concerned with racial and economic justice. 23 This is

that no matter how solid a case he[/she] has, there is always the possibility that he[/she] will lose at trial.
And a defeat at trial means total loss. . . .”); NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM
AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 70–71, 136–37 (2016); Stanley Z. Fisher, In
Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 206–07 (1988);
Lara Bazelon, The Innocence Deniers, SLATE (Jan. 10, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/
01/innocence-deniers-prosecutors-who-have-refused-to-admit-wrongful-convictions.html [https://perm
a.cc/N5QX-B6NC].
17.
See, e.g., RACHEL E. BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS 143–164 (2019).
18.
See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, POLICING THE BLACK MAN, 178–205 (2017); see also Emily
Bazelon & Miriam Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/opinion/how-local-prosecutors-can-reform-their
-justice-systems.html [https://perma.cc/3PCT-LU4A] (“In the past two years, a wave of prosecutors
promising less incarceration and more fairness have been elected across the country.”); Christopher
Connelly, National Advocacy Groups Back Candidates To Challenge Local Prosecutors, NPR (Apr. 10,
2018, 5:01 AM ET) https://www.npr.org/2018/04/10/598440346/national-advocacy-groups-back-candi
dates-to-challenge-local-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/RHD9-TEEY] (chronicling reform movement).
19.
See, e.g., BARKOW, supra note 17, at 143–164.
20.
I. Bennett Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1277, 1297 (2016)
[hereinafter Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn] (“[W]e we are more likely to insist that prosecutors be
zealous advocates in a criminal justice system that is adversarial by design.”).
21.
PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 102 (2009) [hereinafter
BUTLER BOOK].
22.
The perverse incentives of adversarialism extend to the decision not to charge police officers
who violate people’s civil rights; many prosecutors prefer instead to maintain a cozy relationship with
their chief source of—all too often unreliable—evidence. See Chesa Boudin, The Police Answer to Us.
What Will We Do About It?, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/27/opinion/
Boudin-prosecutor-reform.html [https://perma.cc/CZE2-RGME] (“We know what can happen when
prosecutors get too cozy with the police. The refusal to prosecute the police after the deaths of Stephon
Clark in Sacramento in 2018 and Sean Monterrosa in Vallejo, Calif., in June are just two local examples
of the system’s failure.”).
23.
See BUTLER BOOK, supra note 21, at 115 (“Progressives who become prosecutors have
signed up with the wrong team.”).
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especially troubling given the uncontroverted results of prosecutorial
adversarialism: Blackness is punished. To be Black, as Professor Kimani
Paul-Emile argues, means to face increased likelihood—relative to
whites—of being stopped by the police, 24 searched by the police, being
killed during a routine police encounter, 25 and receiving longer prison
sentences.26 One in three Black men go to prison in their lifetime;27 Black
women are three times more likely than white women to be incarcerated;28
and Black boys are seen as guiltier than white boys.29 In addition, although
there is no evidence that Blacks are more likely to use or sell drugs, we are
more likely to be arrested, charged, and convicted for those crimes.30 For all
of these reasons, adversarialism should be rejected.31 But doing so is not
enough.
The problem, though, begins even earlier than the adversarial process.
Even if prosecutors could resist the siren’s call to become more interested
in winning, the culture of prosecutors’ offices selects for new hires with the
willingness to get convictions—including those of juveniles—even in
entry-level positions. 32 These initial points of contact for hiring new
24.
25.
26.

See Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness as Disability?, 106 GEO. L.J. 293, 340–44 (2018).
Id.
See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 108 (2012) (finding that prison sentences of Black men were 19.5%
longer than those of white men for similar crimes between 2007 and 2011); see also Joe Palazzolo,
Racial Gap in Men’s Sentencing, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2013, 5:36 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/article
s/SB10001424127887324432004578304463789858002.
27.
See Cassia Spohn, Race, Crime, and Punishment in the Twentieth and Twenty-First
Centuries, 44 CRIME & JUST. 49, 55 (2015) (noting that in 2001 “the chances of ever going to prison
were highest among black males (32.2 percent) and Hispanic males (17.2 percent)”).
28.
See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2011 8
(2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR99-5D39].
29.
Black Boys Viewed as Older, Less Innocent Than Whites, Research Finds, AM. PSYCHOL.
ASS’N (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2014/03/black-boys-older [https://perm
a.cc/LWE9-PRPD].
30.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL SURVEY ON
DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 26 (2014) (reporting rates of illicit drug
use in the United States in 2013 among persons aged twelve and older were 10.5% for Black people and
9.5% for whites). Black adults in 2014, however, constituted “close to a third of those arrested for drug
possession [and] . . . were more than four times as likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than
white adults.” Tess Borden, Every 25 Seconds: The Human Toll of Criminalizing Drug Use in the United
States, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/10/12/every-25-seco
nds/human-toll-criminalizing-drug-use-united-states# [https://perma.cc/Y5BV-2TU9].
31.
See infra Section II.
32.
The following excerpts from some recent job postings for entry-level prosecutors are
illustrative of this problem. The City of Chesapeake, Virginia, recently described a prosecutor’s job as
follows:
Prosecution of certain misdemeanors, including but not limited to, DUIs, crimes on school
property and domestic violence in the General District and Juvenile Courts and misdemeanor
appeals in Circuit Court. Preparation and trial of all felonies, including but not limited to drug
cases, crimes of violence, vehicular manslaughters, larcenies, fraud cases and any other
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prosecutors make no bones about the fact that the work load will be
intense.33 Seldom do job postings make any mention of an expectation that
a novice prosecutor would be expected to utilize discretion as a tool of
mercy in charging and plea bargaining.34 If prosecutors learn early on that
convictions come first, they are expected to produce a lot of those, and their
discretion is primarily for determining what they can win rather than what
they should, why would we expect them to pursue justice in any wider
sense?
This Article imagines our criminal legal system with prosecutors who
are single mindedly focused on ensuring that justice is done. The
prosecutor’s function as a minister of justice35 remains underexamined and

assignments as made by the Commonwealth’s Attorney. Prosecution of felony cases in J&D
Court, General District Court and Circuit Court.
City of Chesapeake, Virginia, Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney I (closing Jan. 7, 2021) (emphasis
added) (on file with the author). Nor is the prosecution of minors by prosecutors fresh out of law school
unique to Virginia. Centre County, Pennsylvania listed similar job duties in a recent posting. See Centre
County District Attorney’s Office, ADA Job Listing 1 (undated job posting) (on file with the author)
(“Represents the Commonwealth in Juvenile Court proceedings and all appeals therefrom.”). The
prevalence of juvenile prosecutions is great enough that some offices feel the need to note when it will
not be part of a prosecutor’s duties. See, e.g., Montgomery County, Kansas, Assistant County Attorney
(undated job posting), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/Assistant-County-Attorney.pdf (“No
appellate or juvenile work/cases.”).
33.
See, e.g., Williams County, North Dakota, Assistant State’s Attorney (undated job posting)
(on file with the author) (requiring prosecutors to “be available to provide on-call legal assistance outside
of normal work hours”); Okanogan County, Washington, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (undated job
posting), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/District-Court.pdf (“Ability to plan and organize multiple
tasks and responsibilities. Ability to work under pressure and meet deadlines. Ability to successfully
perform responsible and complex work assignments using independent judgment and personal initiative
without direct daily supervision.”); Fulton County, Georgia, Assistant District Attorney I (480007)
(undated job posting), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/480007-Assistant-District-Attorney-I-1.pdf
(“Manages case load: attends scheduled court appearances, including plea and arraignment, status, case
management, final plea, motions, and trial calendar; and schedules trial and hearing dates with judges
and case managers.”).
34.
Of the job postings cited in the previous two footnotes, none used the word “discretion.”
Even oblique references to the possibility that a novice prosecutor would be trusted not to bring a case
were uncommon and often implied that this should be restricted to unwinnable cases. See Centre County,
Pennsylvania, Assistant District Attorney (undated job posting) (on file with the author) (“An Assistant
District Attorney is responsible for evaluating cases, taking into consideration resources, strength of the
evidence, severity of the crime, any impact on victims and the community and policy considerations.”);
Okanogan County, Washington, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (undated job posting), https://ndaa.org/w
p-content/uploads/District-Court.pdf (“Reviews reports for legal sufficiency and determines appropriate
charges to be filed.”); Fulton County, Georgia, Assistant District Attorney I (480007) (undated job
posting), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/480007-Assistant-District-Attorney-I-1.pdf (“Prepares
cases and indictments for presentation to Grand Jury: reviews case file and analyze the facts and
evidence of the case; reviews criminal histories of defendants; determines appropriate charges; ensures
sufficient probable cause; drafts indictments for indictable cases; subpoenas law enforcement officers
and witnesses; and presents cases to Grand Jurors.” (emphasis added)).
35.
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A prosecutor
has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”).
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undertheorized. So, what is a just prosecutor?36 My thesis is that abolition
constitutionalism, critical originalism, and liberation justice can be used in
constructing a prosecutor that improves the ideology and administration of
justice in the United States. It does so in the following ways:
Abolition Constitutionalism.37 The prosecutor—like all criminal justice
actors—swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The Constitution
provides protections, in the form of civil rights and civil liberties, which
were deliberately extended to include Black Americans through the
Reconstruction Amendments. That oath, fully understood, requires not just
rejection of the systemic racism baked into much of the criminal legal
system, but active antiracism. This is more than simply “progressive”
constitutionalism38—it’s abolition constitutionalism. A brief explanation is
necessary.
While the Constitution was largely understood to support and protect
slavery, abolitionists historically developed alternative constitutional
interpretations to oppose slavery. 39 These arguments motivated and
informed the origins of the Reconstruction Amendments.40 But the promise
of this radical vision went unrealized at the hands of white supremacist
courts.41 The effects of this history of anti-Black jurisprudence on business
as usual in our criminal legal system are many, though prosecutors retain
sufficient authority to reshape these processes to abolitionist ends.
In many instances in our criminal legal system judges are unable to
effectively control prosecutors’ actions, as former federal public defender
36.
Some argue that the prosecutor’s duty to ensure that justice is done “is an analytical dead
end” because “[i]t offers neither a meaningful standard to govern prosecutors, nor a useful guideline for
generating specific rules. This core theoretical failing, more than any other factor, explains why
academics, judges, and practitioners have made so little progress articulating concrete guidance for
prosecutorial behavior.” Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1210 (2020).
This Article is a much-needed attempt to fill this gap.
37.
See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Supreme Court, 2018 Term—Foreword: Abolition
Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 50–51 (2019) (“Antislavery activists not only chose to fight on
constitutional ground, but, in the process, also crafted an alternative reading of the Constitution that
proved highly influential for a period of time. Moreover, the fact that the Constitution remains open to
these varying interpretations highlights the potential for prison abolitionists to reclaim an abolition
constitutionalism—or construct a new one—that facilitates rather than impedes the completion of the
freedom struggle begun by their predecessors.”).
38.
See Mark Tushnet, Progressive Constitutionalism: What Is “It”?, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1073,
1077 (2011) (describing progressive constitutionalism as a framework of political constitutionalism
geared toward reducing and eliminating severe material deprivation).
39.
See Roberts, supra note 37, at 55–57 (explaining abolitionist arguments rooted in the
Preamble, Due Process Clause, and notions of birthright citizenship).
40.
See id. at 54 (“Abolitionists fought for the amended Constitution to embody their radical
constitutional vision and to install a ‘second founding’ of the nation built on equal citizenship and
freedom of labor.”).
41.
See id. at 73–74 (“In a series of decisions, beginning with the Slaughter-House Cases in
1873, the Court developed an anti-abolition jurisprudence that preserved white capitalist domination and
shaped constitutional law for the next century.”).
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Eric S. Fish convincingly argues in Prosecutorial Constitutionalism.42 For
example, the due process clause requires prosecutors to reveal exculpatory
evidence before the defendant’s criminal trial.43 It is unclear—indeed there
is a circuit split—whether a prosecutor is required to provide the defendant
with that same evidence prior to a defendant entering a guilty plea.44 In some
jurisdictions, therefore, a prosecutor can keep material exculpatory evidence
from the defense prior to entering a plea agreement.45 Additionally, there
are times in our criminal justice process when judges choose not to accord
full weight to defendants’ constitutional rights out of concern for the
separation of powers or the limitations of judicial doctrine.46 Specifically,
there is very little judicial oversight in prosecutorial decisionmaking
involving charging decisions, plea bargaining, sentencing, and postconviction decisions.47
When judges provide so little oversight, prosecutors have the discretion
to either create or counteract inequality. Too often, they use that discretion
in ways that substantially increase inequality. For example, Blacks
systematically face more and harsher charges than whites—and those
charges usually carry a mandatory-minimum sentence. 48 No one can
seriously contend that, in these circumstances, Blacks receive equal
protection of the laws. We do not. In these situations, prosecutors should
preserve defendants’ constitutional rights even if judicial doctrine does not
require it, and even at the expense of obtaining convictions.
The same is true concerning civil liberties. It is generally understood that
the Framers of our Constitution were distrustful of law enforcement and that
the Bill of Rights intentionally makes it harder for police to do their jobs. 49
Prosecutors, however, have asked judges to adopt restrictive interpretations

42.
See generally Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 260
(2017) [hereinafter Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism].
43.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963).
44.
See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2015) (discussing split);
Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 601–02 (2013)
(surveying courts).
45.
See, e.g., Orman v. Cain, 228 F.3d 616, 617 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Brady requires a prosecutor to
disclose exculpatory evidence for purposes of ensuring a fair trial, a concern that is absent when a
defendant waives trial and pleads guilty.”).
46.
See Alexandra L. Klein, Meaningless Guarantees: Comment on Mitchell E. McCloy’s “Blind
Justice: Virginia’s Jury Sentencing Scheme and Impermissible Burdens on a Defendant’s Right to a Jury
Trial”, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585, 593–95 (2021) (discussing the Supreme Court’s reluctance to
meaningfully enforce the Sixth Amendment).
47.
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
48.
Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing
the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 27–31 (2013).
49.
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to
Domestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1638 (2004) (“The framers of the Constitution
were deeply distrustful of executive power and of the police.”).
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of the Constitution that have resulted in racial profiling,50 pretextual stops,51
and use of excessive force.52 This has led to what many refer to as police
“superpowers.” 53 It is these superpowers, according to Professor Devon
Carbado, that help create and perpetuate a Blue-on-Black violence
ecosystem: police violence against Black people persists because
constitutional structure and qualified immunity “create a disincentive for
police officers to exercise care with respect to when and how they employ
violent force.”54 Prosecutors have the power to play a pivotal role in reining
in those superpowers by advancing individual rights. Prosecutors can do this
by taking a more expansive view of individual rights and by unilaterally
choosing not to take advantage of existing precedent to infringe on that
individual right.
Critical Originalism. 55 Originalism in statutory construction is the
notion that legal texts mean what they meant at the time of their enactment.56
It requires “immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere
of the time” 57 to determine the meaning of a statutory or constitutional
provision. When applied with an awareness of the linguistic tools of
minority subjugation, these methods can help to illuminate the racial animus

50.
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810–13 (1996); id. at 813 (“Subjective intentions
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); see also Devon W. Carbado,
From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police
Violence, 105 CAL. L. REV. 125, 129–30 (2017) (arguing that the “Supreme Court’s legalization of racial
profiling is embedded in the very structure of Fourth Amendment doctrine”); Kevin R. Johnson, How
Racial Profiling in America Became the “Law of the Land”: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren
v. United States and the Need for Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1009–45 (2010).
51.
See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 (holding that when police officers have probable cause to stop
vehicles for traffic infractions, it is irrelevant whether they do so for pretextual reasons); see also
Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
199, 209 (2007) (suggesting that pretextual stops occur “when the justification offered for the detention
is legally sufficient, but is not the actual reason for the stop”).
52.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); see also Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It
Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1452 (2016).
53.
See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD 56 (2017) [hereinafter BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD] (“U.S.
police officers have super powers . . . The police have been granted these powers [by] . . . the United
States Supreme Court . . . .”).
54.
Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes,
104 GEO. L. J. 1479, 1485 (2016).
55.
“Critical Originalism is the melding of anti-subordination deconstruction principles of
Critical Race Theory with the interpretive methodology of Originalism Theory.” Jasmine B. Gonzales
Rose, Language Disenfranchisement in Juries: A Call for Constitutional Remediation, 65 HAST. L.J.
811, 841 (2014).
56.
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 78–82 (2012); Victoria Nourse, Textualism 3.0: Statutory Interpretation After Justice
Scalia, 70 ALA. L. REV. 667, 676 (2019) (“There has always been an ‘originalist’ aspect of ‘new
textualism,’ but this Term’s cases reveal a new emphasis on originalism in statutory interpretation.
Justice Gorsuch appears to be leading the way.”).
57.
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1989).
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behind many facially neutral laws.58 Critical originalism also accounts for
the radical nature of the Reconstruction Amendments. 59 This mode of
interpretation provides prosecutors two important tools to do justice.
First, critical originalism provides context: it confirms that the
criminalization of the use of drugs was driven by racial considerations as
“no one” 60 at the time these criminal statutes were enacted would have
believed otherwise. Specifically, the criminalization of opium, cocaine, and
marijuana was in response to racial concerns. For example, cocaine use
became a crime after false allegations surfaced that it gave Blacks
superhuman powers—it was reported that several bullets could not stop
“cocaine-crazed negroes.”61
Second, under originalist principles, prosecutors need not prosecute nonviolent drug offenses under federal law. Instead, prosecutors should create
robust diversion programs. They can do this by identifying and leveraging
statutes, such as the Speedy Trial Act,62 to enter in deferred-prosecution
agreements—an agreement not to prosecute a defendant for alleged criminal
wrongdoing provided the defendant satisfies certain conditions, such as
completion of a drug-treatment program—with non-violent drug offenders.
Although the original intent behind deferred-prosecution agreements was to
accomplish just this,63 prosecutors have used that tool almost exclusively
for corporations. Businesses responsible for the sale of defective products,
for example, are not typically prosecuted. 64 This is justified by broad
58.
See Gonzales Rose, supra note 55, at 841–42 (“[A]pplying Originalist principles of
interpretation under a lens of Critical Race Theory can help reveal the racially discriminatory intent
behind colorblind laws. However, unlike traditional Originalists, whose starting point is a text’s plain
meaning, a criticalist approach asks us to be concerned about minority subordination, and thus questions
facial neutrality and delves below a law’s epidermis to discern its true original aim and impetus.”).
59.
See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49
HOUS. L. REV. 393, 401–02 (2012) (chronicling the radical politics of James Ashley and his influence
on the Reconstruction Congress’s amendments); Lydia D. Johnson, What Does Justice Have to Do with
Interpreters in the Jury Room?, 84 UMKC L. REV. 941, 959–60 (2016) (applying critical originalist
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment to the exclusion of non-Anglophone jurors).
60.
Justice Antonin Scalia often applied “no one” originalism to issues. See, e.g., Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“When the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868, every State limited marriage to one man and one woman, and no one doubted the
constitutionality of doing so. That resolves these cases.”).
61.
Edward Huntington Williams, Negro Cocaine “Fiends” Are a New Southern Menace, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 8, 1914), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1914/02/08/100299245.pdf.
62.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2).
63.
See, e.g., United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2015) (“The
relevant legislative history demonstrates that deferred-prosecution agreements were originally intended
to give prosecutors the ability to defer prosecution of individuals charged with certain non-violent
criminal offenses to encourage rehabilitation.”).
64.
See, e.g., Information, United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2014 WL 10584763 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 20, 2014) (No.14-CRIM-186), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2014/03/19/to
yota-def-pros-agr.pdf [https://perma.cc/PDT6-7FTC]. In this case, Toyota knowingly sold defective cars
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concerns with the collateral consequences of criminally prosecuting
corporations, namely the potential harm to shareholders and employees.65
This rationale becomes even more compelling when an individual offender
is punished—there are severe collateral consequences to both the family
structure and community.
Liberation Justice. 66 In his groundbreaking law review article, Much
Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, Professor Paul Butler
argues that hip-hop music and culture can transform our criminal legal
system in several important ways.67 First, the hip-hop nation identifies the
problems with our system (including prosecutorial discretion) from the
bottom up.68 They make an extraordinary case that our system was designed
to target and imprison Black, Brown, and poor people. For example, while
Blacks represent about fourteen percent of monthly drug users, they account
for more than fifty-six percent of people incarcerated for drug use. 69
Because of these concerns, there must be a deep commitment by prosecutors
to establish integrity and fairness in our system.
Second, hip-hop acknowledges that punishment is appropriate in certain
contexts, but, in others, the unintended collateral consequences of potential
punishment outweigh the perceived benefits. 70 Prosecutors, thus, must
consider their effect on others in the community. Hip-hop is decidedly
to consumers and misled regulators that resulted in the deaths of eighty-nine people. The docket sheet
indicates that, on March 19, 2014, “A deferred prosecution agreement was entered and the case was
adjourned until March 20, 2017.” Id.
65.
See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 330 (2007) (noting that deferred-prosecution agreements were designed, in part,
to “achieve[ ] a result that minimizes the collateral damage to shareholders and employees”).
66.
I coin this term to represent a synthesis of the underlying philosophies found in the work of
hip-hop artists, the activism of the Movement for Black Lives, and a great deal of prior Critical Race
scholarship. At its core, liberation justice requires an approach of empathy and respect for the essential
dignity of criminal defendants, prisoners, and their communities. Section III.C will explore the contours
of liberation justice in detail. While my initial application in this article addresses issues of race in
criminal justice, the philosophical framework must be understood to apply structurally and
intersectionally. Further application of this approach could address issues such as selective prosecution
in domestic violence and sex work cases; the failure of the criminal legal system to protect trans
persons—and in particular trans women of color; the juvenile/adult charging decision; the role of
defendant wealth in prosecutorial decisions; the threat of deportation as a prosecutorial tool; and
differential incarceration rates in rural and urban communities. “Whatever affects one directly, affects
all indirectly.” Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963).
67.
Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 983,
986–87 (2004) [hereinafter Butler Article].
68.
BUTLER BOOK, supra note 21, at 134 (“These voices are worth listening to; they evaluate
criminal justice from the bottom up. Our current punishment regime has been designed from the top
down, and that, in part, explains why many perceive it to be ineffective or unfair.”).
69.
Id. at 140; see also Pierre Thomas, 1 in 3 Young Black Men in Justice System, WASH. POST,
Oct. 5, 1995, at A1.
70.
See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004) (arguing that mass incarceration damages social
networks, distorts social norms, and destroys social citizenship).
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abolitionist. Hip-hop culture advances sound solutions to the problem of the
carceral state, including, among others, that drug users should not be
punished because of their addiction; that the cruelty of prison should only
be used, if at all, to remove those who become too violent to coexist safely
within society; that rights be restored and criminal records for non-violent
offenses be expunged; and that criminal law no longer be used for racial
subordination. Therefore, prosecutors who understand liberation justice
should support, in certain circumstances, decriminalization of drug
offenses, the elimination of bail for nonviolent offenses, prosecutorial
nullification,71 expungement motions, and the Movement for Black Lives,
which seeks accountability for police killings of Black people.72
Liberation justice demands that the prosecutor’s thumb be removed from
the scales of justice. The prosecutor’s biases are too often a motivating
factor in charging decisions—why young Black and Brown people are
charged, convicted, and incarcerated for petty crimes, while police officers
walk free after killing them. The prosecutor’s adversarial drive to win at all
(legal) costs leads to unjust differences in charges, convictions,
punishments, and collateral consequences. If Black lives are to matter in our
criminal legal system, it is incumbent upon prosecutors to employ their
discretion in the pursuit of justice rather than victory.
This Article is a beginning. It is an early attempt to fashion a prosecutor
that is solely concerned with doing justice. That construction is informed by
and committed to abolition constitutionalism, critical originalism, and
liberation justice principles. There is much common ground in these
seemingly disparate threads of theory. It is in these spaces where justice is
painted—not in definitional words, but in concrete actions—for
prosecutors. My novel construction of the prosecutor will help ensure that
justice finally becomes the touchstone of our criminal legal system.
71.
See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1252 (2011)
(discussing “prosecutorial nullification,” meaning when prosecutor declines to prosecute because of
disagreement with the law or belief that its application would be unwise or unfair).
72.
See Amna A. Akbar, How Defund and Disband Became the Demands, N.Y. REVIEW (June
15, 2020), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/06/15/how-defund-and-disband-became-the-demands/
(“From coast to coast, the target of these protests is the very institution of policing, rather than ‘a few
bad apples.’ The demands reflect growing recognition that the problem is not individual police or
isolated bad acts, and that reforms like body cameras and civilian review boards simply will not lead to
the profound change that many know is necessary. The protesters are saying, loud and clear, that the
only solution to the violence of policing is less policing—or maybe, none at all.”); Josiah Bates,
Sherrilyn Ifill Says This Is the Time for ‘Transformative’ Change in America, TIME (June 23, 2020, 1:44
PM), https://time.com/5857188/sherrilyn-ifill-time100-talks-police-reform/ (“Coupled with the impact
of the global coronavirus pandemic, Floyd’s death, as well as the killings of Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud
Arbery and other Black Americans has led to this moment of reckoning, she explained.”); Helier
Cheung, George Floyd Death: Why US Protests Are So Powerful This Time, BBC NEWS (June 8, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52969905
[https://perma.cc/YZW6-SB4A]
(“Local
governments, sports and businesses appear readier to take a stand this time - most notably with the
Minneapolis city council pledging to dismantle the police department.”).
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the
modern-day prosecutor. There, this Article will accomplish three things.
First, it briefly discusses how prosecutorial power is rooted in the
separation-of-powers principle. This is very important to note upfront
because prosecutorial power became more entrenched in our constitutional
jurisprudence—essentially making prosecutors untouchable—during the
mass incarceration era. Second, it provides a general overview on how
prosecutors exercise their discretion within our criminal legal system. Third,
it explores prosecutorial adversarialism and how that structure turns
prosecutors into win-seekers. Part II examines the mass incarceration crisis.
There, this Article will draw a direct line from the concentration of power
in prosecutors to mass incarceration. Specifically, this Article contends that
the racial disparities in our criminal legal system exists because
prosecutorial adversarialism punishes Blackness. For this reason,
adversarialism should be rejected. Finally, Part III argues that prosecutors
must fully embrace their duty to seek justice. In this Part, I attempt to bring
theoretical clarity to what precisely doing justice means. The answer is
found in abolition constitutionalism, critical originalism, and liberation
justice. That’s where the just prosecutor can be built.
I. THE MODERN-DAY PROSECUTOR
It has long been true that “[t]he prosecutor has more control over life,
liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.” 73 A survey of
criminal justice literature reveals a modern consensus that prosecutors “rule
the criminal justice system.”74 Indeed, many prominent scholars and jurists
have argued that prosecutors—not legislators, judges, or police—“are the
criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.” 75 The breadth of prosecutors’

73.
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3
(1940).
74.
See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—And What Can Be
Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1436 (2017) (“[F]or the immediate future at least, prosecutors
. . . will be the real rulers of the American criminal justice system.”); Erik Luna & Marianne Wade,
Introduction, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2010) (“For all intents and purposes, prosecutors
are the criminal justice system . . . .”); Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171,
172 (2019) (“Compelling assertions about prosecutorial dominance leap off the pages of the criminal
justice literature.”).
75.
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506
(2001) (“The definition of crimes and defenses plays a . . . much smaller role in the allocation of criminal
punishment than we usually suppose. In general, the role it plays is to empower prosecutors”); see also
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2548, 2549 (2004) (“[T]he law that determines who goes to prison and for how long—is chiefly written
by prosecutors, not by legislators or judges.”). This is not to say that those actors do not affect criminal
justice outcomes. They do in significant ways. For a recent excellent discussion on how police officers,
legislators, and judges impact our criminal legal system, see Jeffrey Bellin, supra note 74, at 187–203.
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discretion and control over the criminal legal system warrants scrutiny.76
This Part examines the source of prosecutorial power, discusses how
prosecutors exercise their power, and explores adversarialism.
A. The Prosecutor: Money, Power, and Respect
“It’s the key to life: Money, Power, and Respect.” 77 Although
prosecutors may not have the money—in the sense of being
overcompensated for their work—they have extraordinary power and
command much respect in our criminal legal system. This power is so
expansive as to effectively combine executive, legislative, and adjudicatory
powers. So, where does this power and respect come from?
The prevailing view today is that prosecutorial power is rooted in the
separation-of-powers principle.78 That is, prosecutors have broad discretion
as members of the executive branch to decide who to charge, what to charge,
whether to offer a plea agreement, and, in many instances, what the sentence
will be. Courts generally will hesitate to inquire into—and will show respect
to—the prosecutor’s decisionmaking process. 79 Prosecutorial
decisionmaking rests exclusively in the province of the executive branch
and thus only rarely must be explained.80
The prosecutor’s broad and remarkable authority seems to be an anomaly
in our constitutional structure.81 The aim of the Framers of our Constitution
was to “divide and arrange the several offices [of government] in such a
manner as that each may be a check on the other. . . .”82 Yet prosecutors,
who wield both executive and adjudicative powers, elude this
arrangement. 83 The prosecutor’s power to enforce often turns into their
power to adjudicate because the prosecutor who investigates the case can
make the final charging decision, determine what plea to accept, and
effectively decide the ultimate sentence. Even though courts routinely
76.
Angela J. Davis, In Search of Racial Justice: The Role of the Prosecutor, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 821, 832 (2013).
77.
THE LOX FEATURING DMX & LIL’ KIM, Money, Power & Respect, on MONEY, POWER &
RESPECT (Bad Boy Records 1998).
78.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An
Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 46 (2014) (“As the Supreme Court
has explained, prosecutorial discretion is entailed by constitutional separation of powers . . . .”).
79.
See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“It follows, as an
incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free
exercise of the discretionary power of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal
prosecutions.”).
80.
Id.
81.
See Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and
Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 11 (2009) (“The federal prosecutor’s broad and unreviewable
authority is an anomaly in our system of separated powers.”).
82.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob Ernest Cooke ed., 1961).
83.
Krauss, supra note 81, at 11.
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review executive and adjudicatory actions by executive branch
administrative agencies, they frustratingly condone this concentration of
power in prosecutors. 84 For example, Professor Rachel Barkow
persuasively argues that because we have combined prosecutorial and
adjudicatory powers in a single actor, which can lead to gross abuses, we
need to consider an administrative law solution to “assess the bigger
[prosecutorial] policy calls and check them for irrationality.”85
There used to be some institutional balance. The Constitution vests
judicial actors—judges and juries—with tools to protect defendants from
government overreach.86 Juries can, and as some advocates argue should,
practice jury nullification 87 —the decision to disregard the evidence and
acquit an otherwise guilty defendant. Juries, “unlike any official, are in no
wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do . . . .” 88 Their
unreviewable power to acquit allows juries to check executive overreach in
a particular case, which is “the great corrective of law in its actual
administration.”89 Judges, too, were able to check prosecutorial excess by
formulating individualized sentences for defendants.90
In addition, there are constitutional protections in place to shield
individual defendants. The Due Process Clause, for example, requires
prosecutors to operate in good faith, barring them from tricking a defendant
into pleading guilty or reneging on their promises once a binding plea
agreement was entered into.91 A defendant could also theoretically bring an
equal protection claim for vindictive or selective prosecution on “an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification,” but the courts have set such high hurdles for doing so that
almost no one succeeds.92 All of these constitutional safeguards in criminal
cases have been greatly diminished.

84.
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 993 (2006) (arguing that “the existing approach to separation of powers in criminal matters cannot
be squared with constitutional theory or sound institutional design”); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869
(2009) [hereinafter Barkow, Policing of Prosecutors].
85.
BARKOW, supra note 17, at 136.
86.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 and amend. VI.
87.
Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System,
105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995) (“Considering the costs of law enforcement to the black community and
the failure of white lawmakers to devise significant nonincarcerative responses to black antisocial
conduct, it is the moral responsibility of black jurors to emancipate some guilty black outlaws.”).
88.
United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775–76 (2d Cir. 1942), rev’d on other
grounds, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
89.
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 18 (1910).
90.
BARKOW, supra note 17, at 128.
91.
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
92.
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,
456 (1962)).
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No one should be surprised when this institutional balance broke down.
Three distinct but related events in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, led to the deep
entrenchment of prosecutorial power in our constitutional system, ushering
in the mass incarceration era. First, the legislative landscape changed in the
1960s and 70s. In an effort to get tough on crime, Congress and state
legislatures expanded criminal codes and created mandatory-minimum
sentencing regimes that gave prosecutors the ability to choose between a
greater range of possible charges to file or threaten to file.93 The new statutes
often dictated a mandatory sentence, which judges were required to
follow.94 This diminished the judicial check on prosecutors.
Second, although “plea bargaining existed as a sub-rosa practice for most
of the nation’s history,” the Supreme Court officially approved this practice
in 1971, which “led to astronomical increases in the rates of cases settled
outside of trial . . . .”95 Today, over 97.1% of convictions in the federal
system are the result of pleas.96 This diminished the jury check, too.
Finally, the Supreme Court made prosecutors practically untouchable by
unequivocally insulating prosecutorial discretion in the separation-ofpowers principle and turning a blind eye to the anti-Blackness exercised in
prosecutorial discretion.97 The Court thereby diminished its own appellate
check.
Although executive discretion was linked to the separation-of-powers
principle in the 1920s,98 the Supreme Court did not begin to grapple with
the meaning of discretion until the 1970s. Indeed, “prosecutorial discretion”
93.
See Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on Crime
Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 12 (2013) (“Capitalizing on overwhelming public opinion in favor of more
rigid crime control, conservative politicians at the national and state levels stoked their constituents’ fear
of crime waves and endorsed policies designed to put more offenders in prison for longer periods of
time.”); id. at 21–22 (discussing the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentences for drug and gun
charges and the connection between their reliance on numerical elements of charges and the lengths of
sentences Black defendants received).
94.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 87; BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN
AMERICA 2 (2006).
95.
BARKOW, supra note 17, at 129–30.
96.
See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions
and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL YEAR 2015, 4 (June 2016), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2016/FY15_Overview_Federal_Crim
inal_Cases.pdf (“Case Disposition: In fiscal year 2015 the vast majority of offenders (97.1%) pleaded
guilty.”).
97.
See United States v. Labonte, 520 U.S. 751, 761–62 (1997) (accepting a prosecutor’s decision
to seek enhanced penalties for one defendant but not another as an appropriate and integral feature of
the criminal legal system); Krauss, supra note 81, at 28–32 (2009) (describing the development of the
modern theory of prosecutorial discretion).
98.
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922) (identifying the Attorney General as “the hand
of the President in taking care that the laws of the United States in protection of the interests of the
United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offenses be faithfully executed”).
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did not enter into the Court’s lexicon until 1961 when Justice Harlan
described a state prosecutor’s ability to enforce the laws as “unbounded
prosecutorial discretion.” 99 In 1978, right before our prison population
explosion, the Court firmly planted “prosecutorial discretion” in the
separation-of-powers principle in Bordenkircher v. Hayes.100 In that case,
defendant Paul Hayes rejected a plea deal that would have capped his
sentence for forging a check—for $88.30—to five years. The prosecutor
then followed through on his threat to seek mandatory life imprisonment
under the state’s three-strike law. The Court found no due process violation
and upheld the life sentence, stating “so long as the prosecutor has probable
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute,
the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” 101 After this
case, the Court, in subsequent opinions, described prosecutorial discretion
as “broad”102 and, in 1985, explicitly stated that the prosecutor’s “broad
discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is
particularly ill-suited to judicial review.” 103 Indeed, as several
commentators have observed, prosecutorial discretion has been enhanced
and entrenched to the point of absorbing legislative power.104

99.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 530 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
100. 434 U.S. 357 (1978). This is not to say that other courts did not already conclude that
prosecutorial discretion rests robustly in the separation-of-powers principle. As Professor Bennett
Capers elucidates:
One of the clearest examples . . . arose out of the riots at the Attica Correctional Facility in
1971. As guards were ostensibly taking steps to regain control of the prison, they retaliated by
killing several prisoners and continued to assault and beat prisoners after regaining control.
When . . . prosecutors declined to pursue charges against the guards, prisoners and family
members sued. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the claims, citing the
discretionary power of prosecutors.
Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, supra note 20, at 1296 n.89.
The Second Circuit concluded: “The primary ground upon which this traditional judicial
aversion to compelling prosecutions has been based is the separation of powers doctrine.” Inmates
of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973).
101. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 (1978).
102. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11, 382 (1982).
103. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
104. See Logan Sawyer, Reform Prosecutors and Separation of Powers, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 603,
618 (2020) (“[P]rosecutors legislate every time they set generally applicable, prospective rules about
who to prosecute, rather than determine whether to prosecute based on a case-by-case analysis of
individual facts.”); Barkow, Policing of Prosecutors, supra note 84, at 871 n.9 (“Given the broad
wording of many federal criminal laws, one could argue that prosecutors possess legislative power as
well.”); Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California’s Separation of Powers, 51
UCLA L. REV. 1079, 1097 (2004) (“That is, given the range of permissible enforcement actions under
criminal laws (and many other laws) is extremely broad, it is the prosecutors’ pattern of decisions that
shape the meaning of the law, not the underlying statute itself. Where prosecutors make law in the course
of executing a statute, the command to separate lawmaking from law implementation seems
nonsensical.”) (quoting M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1127, 1193 (2000) (citations omitted)).
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Around the same time, the Supreme Court—as former federal prosecutor
Bennett Capers expounds in his tour-de-force article The Prosecutor’s
Turn—decided to take a “hands-off approach” when confronted with the
most troubling features of prosecutorial discretion.105 Two cases illustrate
this point. First, in McClesky v. Kemp, the Court passed the buck when
confronted with “uncontroverted evidence of widespread racial
discrimination in the selection of capital defendants”, 106 stating,
“Legislatures . . . are better qualified to weigh and ‘evaluate the results of
statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility
of approach that is not available to the courts.’”107 Second, in United States
v. Armstrong, the Court disregarded evidence indicating that the prosecutor
engaged in selective prosecutions by singling out particular defendants on
the basis of their race, holding that the defendant failed to show that the
government did not prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races.108
The Court’s abdication of its duty to enforce constitutional protections in
these cases made prosecutors virtually untouchable.
In sum, executive, legislative, and adjudicatory powers are consolidated
in prosecutors. In exercising their powers, prosecutors are granted broad
discretion, which courts enforce through the separation-of-powers principle.
This deferential approach gives prosecutors nearly unchallenged control of
the criminal legal system.

105. Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, supra note 20, at 1296.
106. Id. at 1296–97.
107. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
186 (1976)). In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court held that a study proffered by Mr. McCleskey, which
showed significant racial disparities in capital sentencing, did not demonstrate a constitutional violation
because of the “safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process” and the value of jury trials.
481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987). Yet that study showed that a majority of defendants sentenced to death for
killing white victims would not have faced capital punishment if their victims had been Black—and
Black defendants convicted of killing white victims were by far the most likely to face execution. See
id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This was not simply a comparison of rates subject to nitpicking over
factors it left out; the study accounted for about 230 nonracial factors to find the racial disparity—and
the majority still discounted it. See id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).The Court accepted the validity
of the study and its findings, but nonetheless declined to reverse Mr. McCleskey’s death sentence.
Because the study did not prove that the prosecutors in Mr. McCleskey’s case intended to discriminate
against him because of his race, the Court rejected his claim. Id. at 286–87. The case’s infamy is only
compounded by the majority opinion’s author—by then retired—repudiating his vote a mere four years
later. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451 (1994).
108. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996).
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B. The “Untouchables” Superpower: Prosecutorial Discretion and
Control
Power, in the sense prosecutors wield it, is control.109 Prosecutors’ nearplenary control over many stages of the criminal adjudication process mean
that they, rather than the legislators, judges, and police also shape our
criminal legal system, typically determine the ultimate outcome.110 Below,
I discuss how prosecutors utilize their discretion to exercise
disproportionate control of many of the most critical stages of the process.
At the beginning of a criminal case the prosecutor has enormous
discretion to decide whether to charge the defendant, and, if so, with what
crimes.111 Because the crime charged often carries a mandatory-minimum
sentence, the prosecutor has “a basically unreviewable power to decide how
much or how little punishment the defendant may face.”112 Even judicial
tools for granting shorter sentences are subject to prosecutorial control.113
The prosecutor’s unilateral control continues in grand jury proceedings
and plea bargaining as Professor Eric Fish demonstrates in his works.114 In
the American system the prosecutor heavily influences the indictment
decision by selecting the evidence a grand jury will see with virtually no

109. See Power, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/power
[https://perma.cc/8RVD-9LZA] (defining power as “possession of control, authority, of influence over
others”);
Power,
DICTIONARY.COM,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/power
[https://perma.cc/A26A-CYA9] (defining power as “the possession of control or command over
people”).
110. I want to be clear here. I understand that, as argued by some, “it takes a village” to send
someone to prison. See Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass
Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 837 (2018) (reviewing JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE
CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017)). Notwithstanding
the fact that the “track is laid by legislators and passes through critical gateways controlled by police,
judges, and other actors,” Jeffrey Bellin, supra note 74, at 181, it is the prosecutor (and only the
prosecutor), as explained above, that executive, legislative, and adjudicatory power are consolidated in.
111. See Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 260 (“A judge cannot require
that the prosecutor charge or not charge a particular crime, nor can a judge supervise prosecutorial
charging decisions across cases to ensure that different defendants are treated similarly.”).
112. Id.
113. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018); Wade v.
United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992) (providing for a departure from mandatory minimum sentences
for defendants who provide “substantial assistance”—but only if the prosecutor files a motion asking
for one); see also Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 108 (1994) (“The most a court can do if it
disagrees with the prosecutor’s assessment of the defendant’s assistance is review the prosecutor’s
failure to file a substantial assistance motion for an unconstitutional motive.”). The prosecutor’s
authority is the same under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), which provides that the court only has authority to
impose a sentence below the mandatory-minimum sentence proscribed by law if the government files a
motion.
114. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 262; see also generally Eric S. Fish,
Against Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419 (2018) [hereinafter Fish, Against Adversary
Prosecution].
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judicial oversight 115 A prosecutor who does not want to bring charges—
even those the grand jury might support—can simply choose not to present
the relevant statutes, as the prosecutors in the grand jury investigating
Breonna Taylor’s death did.116 This control over charging continues through
plea bargaining: the prosecutor determines what charges to retain, the
benefits a defendant may receive from cooperation, and recommend
sentences.117 Prosecutors can pressure defendants by charging them with
many offenses for the same conduct.118 Mandatory minimum sentences and
felony enhancements can mean that refusing a bargain exposes defendants
to much higher penalties and costs at trial. 119 Given the choice between
either pleading guilty and receiving a five-year sentence or risking a
mandatory life sentence at trial,120 defendants often take the deal, even when
they are innocent. 121 Under such circumstances, a guilty plea is a safer
choice—and prosecutorial power is one reason why. 122

115. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992) (“[I]n its day-to-day functioning, the
grand jury generally operates without the interference of a presiding judge. It swears in its own witnesses
and deliberates in total secrecy.”) (citations omitted); William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury,
64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 174 (1973) (“[T]he grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor
who, if he is candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any time, for almost anything, before
any grand jury.”); Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 260; Ben Casselman, It’s
Incredibly Rare for a Grand Jury to Do What Ferguson’s Just Did, F IVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 24, 2014,
9:30
PM),
http://fivethirtyeight.com/dtalab/ferguson-michael-brown-indictment-darren-wilson
(“According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. attorneys prosecuted 162,000 federal cases in 2010,
the most recent year for which we have data. Grand juries declined to return an indictment in 11 of
them.”).
116. See Elizabeth Joseph, Breonna Taylor grand jurors say there was an ‘uproar’ when they
realized officers wouldn’t be charged with her death, CNN (Oct. 30, 2020, 5:18 PM), https://www.cnn.c
om/2020/10/29/us/breonna-taylor-grand-jurors/index.html [https://perma.cc/7DVM-H5SU] (“‘Even
though we asked for other charges to be brought, we were never told of any additional charges. We were
just told that they didn’t feel that they can make any charges stick’ and that LMPD officers were justified
in returning fire,’ the juror said.” (missing quotation mark in original)).
117. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 263; see also Barkow, Policing of
Prosecutors, supra note 84, at 876–84.
118. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 263; see also DOUGLAS HUSAK,
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 22–23 (2008); Stuntz, supra note 75, at
2567–68.
119. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12–19 (1978)
(“contrast[ing] plea bargaining with medieval European law of torture”); Richard A. Oppel, Jr.,
Sentencing Shift Gives New Clout to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2011, at A1 (“After decades of
new laws to toughen sentencing for criminals, prosecutors have gained greater leverage to extract guilty
pleas from defendants and reduce the number of cases that go to trial, often by using the threat of more
serious charges with mandatory sentences or other harsher penalties.”).
120. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
121. The “innocence problem” is a common complaint about plea bargaining. See Gregory M.
Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 148 (2011) (“The
objections that have been leveled against plea bargaining are numerous and diverse, but most stem from
a common problem: plea bargaining reduces the ability of the criminal justice system to avoid convicting
the innocent.”).
122. DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND LAISSEZ
FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 92 (2016) (emphasis original).
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Additionally, exercising the trial right carries significant financial costs,
including, in many states, a “surcharge on defendants who exercise their
constitutional rights to counsel, confrontation, and trial by jury.” 123 For
example, Virginia charges a $50 tax on “the defendant’s constitutional right
to confront witnesses.” 124 The number of pleas has increased because
prosecutorial leverage increased.125
These structural barriers make prosecutors practically untouchable when
exercising their full discretion to control many stages of our criminal justice
process. When prosecutors are driven to win, this power distorts the balance
of justice and leaves criminal defendants to bear the losses.
C. Adversarialism: “You Win or You Lose”
The modern prosecutor inhabits the conflicting roles of an adversary and
an administrator of justice. On the one hand, prosecutors are to
dispassionately ensure that justice is done, which “requires attentiveness to
systemic concerns, including the rights of defendants.”126 After all, the front
wall of the Department of Justice proclaims that “[t]he United States wins
its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.” 127 But the
prosecutor’s business is also against the accused person.128 Indeed, “[i]sn’t
the whole idea of becoming a prosecutor to put the bad guys behind bars
and keep the public safe?” 129 The tension between diligently and fairly

123. John D. King, Privatizing Criminal Procedure, 107 GEO. L.J. 561, 561 (2019) (discussing
the practice of surcharging defendants who exercise their constitutional rights).
124. Id. at 578; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2–187.1(F) (West 2017) (imposing a fee on
defendants who demand confrontation and are found guilty).
125. Many commentators have argued that “American criminal justice would grind to a halt” if
“the vast majority of defendants did not plead guilty.” See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 53, at 222. This
could also, as argued by Michelle Alexander, create a productive chaos in the criminal legal system that
would force lawmakers to deal with mass incarceration. See Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the
Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2012) https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-t
o-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/FAP4-2Y5D].
126. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, supra note 114, at 1428 (2018).
127. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see id. at 88 (finding that prosecutors “do[] not
comport with standards of justice” when suppressing material evidence).
128. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 249, 270–71 (2019) (examining the ways in which constitutional criminal procedure treats criminal
defendants as effectively banished from the polity and providing independent reasons for why we should
refer to prosecutors as representatives of the state rather than the people).
129. Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady,
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1133, 1140 (2005); see also Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (“The
very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a
case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.”
(emphasis added)).
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prosecuting defendants 130 is irreconcilable because adversarialism
incentivizes winning above all else.131 As one scholar put it, “There is a
courthouse saying—known by anyone who has ever practiced criminal
law—that expresses the ethos of winning over everything else in a grisly,
sardonic way: ‘Any prosecutor can convict the guilty. It takes real talent to
convict the innocent.”’132
It is worth briefly highlighting the incentives that have created an
“adversarial mindset at the root of modern prosecutorial excess.” 133
Prosecutors face professional pressures and incentives “to focus on
punishment and conviction to the exclusion of all else.” 134 Although
prosecution is a highly local affair in the United States, there appears to be
one common thread in each prosecutor’s office: conviction rates matter and
attorneys who have a reputation for winning are promoted.135 Some “offices
even give prosecutors conviction bonuses, have them compete over the
number of convictions they secure, shame them for losing cases, and
perform rituals to celebrate trial victories.”136 Prioritizing competition, with
the attendant pressures or adversarial responses from other stakeholders in
130. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247–48 (1943) (describing the dual roles of the
prosecutor and stating that the prosecutor in the case at hand chose to address the jury with “highly
prejudicial” remarks at the expense of fairness and justice); United States v. Wilson, 578 F.2d 67, 71
(5th Cir. 1978) (“Caught up in the adversary process and the emotional atmosphere of trial combat,
prosecutors too often pursue strategies with a singular determination rather than with a careful
deliberation.”).
131. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor As Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted
from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 36 (2009) (emphasizing that the “image of the
prosecutor as carnivorous aggressor in the adversarial den of the criminal courts is alive and well”);
Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: Is the
Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 295 (2001)
(arguing that because prosecutors’ promotions are based upon conviction rates, “prosecutors seek
convictions to boost their ‘score’ rather than seeking justice.”).
132. Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
355, 388–91 (2001) (stating that the overriding self-interest of prosecutors to win a case at times trumps
their obligation to seek justice); see also THE THIN BLUE LINE (Third Floor Productions 1988)
(according to the appellate attorney, Melvyn Carson Bruder, “[p]rosecutors in Dallas have said for
years—any prosecutor can convict a guilty man. It takes a great prosecutor to convict an innocent man”).
133. Bellin, supra note 36, at 1212.
134. See Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, supra note 114, at 1432; see also ANGELA J.
DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 3 (2007); DANIEL S.
MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT
2–4 (2013).
135. See Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, supra note 114, at 1432; see, also DAVID A.
HARRIS, FAILED EVIDENCE: WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE 104 (2012) (“[P]rosecutors’
careers advance according to their conviction rates. The higher the rate, the better they do.”).
136. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, supra note 114, at 1432; see also VAN CLEVE, supra
note 16, at 70–71; Evan Moore, ‘Win at All Costs’ Is Smith County’s Rule, Critics Claim, HOUS. CHRON.
(last updated July 29, 2011, 2:36 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/article/Win-at-all-costs-is-SmithCounty-s-rule-1632942.php [https://perma.cc/5MT7-N59M]; Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Part
2: The Flip Side of a Fair Trial, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 11, 1999, 2:00 AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial2-story.html [https://perma.cc/48 L8VHKQ].
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the criminal legal system, keeps prosecutors fixated on winning. 137 This
creates a “them or us” mindset—prosecutors are part of a team, and they
want to win.138 Most prosecutors cede the responsibility of considering the
defendant’s interests to defense lawyers. Prosecutors rationalize this choice
by relying on the defense attorney’s obligation to represent their client’s
interests and rights.139
In sum, prosecutors are primarily interested in winning, which means
securing a conviction. That motivation does not evaporate when a
prosecutor has a weak case and a sweeter plea deal for the defendant is still
a conviction. So long as prosecutors stay within the rules, they are
compelled to bend all their decisions toward the strategic goal of winning
the case. After all, “the prosecutor who is too sympathetic toward the
defendant’s plight or too suspicious of police is not doing her job.”140
*

*

*

There is one important case, which is often overlooked, that
demonstrates all the points this Article made in the previous three sections
and deserves our attention—Darden v. Wainwright. 141 Willie Jasper
Darden, a Black man, was charged and convicted of robbery, assault with
intent to kill, and murder. 142 The alleged facts of this case are quite
disturbing. Darden allegedly, on furlough from a Florida prison, robbed a
furniture store, shot and killed the owner of the furniture store, sexually
assaulted the owner’s wife, and shot and wounded an innocent bystander.143
During the guilt phase of the criminal trial, the prosecutor, a white man,

137. See Fisher, supra note 16, at 207 (“The moral and political climate in an agency can foster a
‘conviction psychology’ more powerfully than can any specific policy basing promotions on an
assistant’s conviction rate.”); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 792 (2003) (“[O]ne ought not underestimate the unifying
influence of a shared commitment to ‘getting the bad guys,’ hardened by the adversarial process,
nurtured by mutual respect and need, and on occasion lubricated by alcohol.” (citations omitted)); Ken
White, Confessions of an Ex-Prosecutor, REASON (June 23, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://reason.com/archive
s/2016/06/23/confessions-of-an-ex-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/95VE-MHBZ] (“[M]y experience
showed me that prosecutors are strongly influenced to disregard and minimize rights by the culture that
surrounds them. Disciplining or firing miscreants may be necessary, but it’s not enough: It doesn’t
address the root causes of fearful culture and bad incentives.”).
138. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984) (“‘While a criminal trial is not a game
in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice
of unarmed prisoners to gladiators.”’) (quoting United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634,
640 (7th Cir. 1975)).
139. BUTLER BOOK, supra note 21, at 114–15.
140. Id. at 115.
141. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
142. Id. at 170–71.
143. Id. at 171–75.
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referred to Darden before an all-white144 jury as an “animal” and stated that,
among other incendiary comments, “he shouldn’t be out of his cell unless
he has a leash on him and a prison guard at the other end of that leash.”145
Most strikingly, the “prosecutor expressed the desire to see [Darden] sitting
at counsel table with his face blown away by a shotgun.” 146 The jury
convicted and sentenced Darden to death despite conflicting evidence of his
innocence.147 On appeal, Darden argued that his due process right to a fair
trial was violated when the prosecutor made a summation that contained
those extremely inflammatory comments. Although the Court
acknowledged that those comments were inappropriate, it held that any
error was harmless as the weight of the evidence against Darden was
“heavy.”148 Darden was executed in 1989.
In a stinging dissent, Justice Harry Blackmun exclaimed the following:
This Court has several times used vigorous language in denouncing
government counsel for such conduct as that of the prosecutor here.
But, each time, it has said that, nevertheless, it would not reverse.
Such an attitude of helpless piety is, I think, undesirable. It means
actual condonation of counsel’s alleged offense, coupled with verbal
disapprobation. If we continue to do nothing practical to prevent such
conduct, we should cease to disapprove it. . . . [O]ur rules on the
subject are pretend-rules. . . . Government counsel, employing such
tactics, are the kind who, eager to win victories, will gladly pay the
small price of a ritualistic verbal spanking. The practice of this
court—recalling the bitter tear shed by the Walrus as he ate the
oysters—breeds a deplorably cynical attitude towards the
judiciary.149
These words contain a deep warning: Prosecutors have become largely
untouchable in our criminal legal system. Their discretion—imbued with
executive, legislative, and adjudicatory power—will lead to gross injustice
if left unchecked in an adversarial system. At heart, what Justice Blackmun
was really struggling with was this: quis custodiet ipsos custodies? Who
will guard the guards themselves? The answer: no one, as the Black
community knows to be true. The country did not heed Justice Blackmun’s
144. At the time of Darden’s trial, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1980), had not been decided.
In Batson, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant’s equal protection rights were violated when
a prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to remove jurors based on race.
145. Darden, 477 U.S. at 180 n.11; Id. at n.12.
146. Welsh S. White, Prosecutors’ Closing Arguments at the Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 297, 306-08 (1990-91) (citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 180 n.12).
147. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 199–200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 182.
149. Id. at 205–06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co.,
155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., dissenting)).
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warning. Consequently, prosecutors—tethered to adversarialism—became
(and remain) the principal drivers of mass incarceration.150
II. WHO PAYS THE PRICE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER?
Two of the most influential books about race in many years—The New
Jim Crow by Michelle Alexander151 and Between the World and Me by TaNehisi Coates152—tackle, in different ways, the question posed by hip-hop
artists Meek Mill and Jay-Z: “What’s Free?” 153 The question is asked
several times during the track after the artists make the compelling case that
the criminal legal system was designed to target and punish Blacks.154 Both
Alexander and Coates agree with this assessment. Moreover, both contend
that “mass incarceration is a form of social control of Blacks”155 and that
prosecutors—more than any other actor—are responsible. 156 It is the
prosecutors, according to Alexander, that “holds the keys to the jail-house
door.” 157 So, to answer the question: nothing is free in a criminal legal
system that declared Blacks public enemy number one. And, in an
adversarial system—where prosecutors value winning above all else,
including doing justice—Blackness is punished. This section explores my
answer more fully.
A. “Tryna Fix the System and the Way That They Designed It”: The War
on Drugs and Mass Incarceration
It is no secret that some crimes were created specifically to target and
punish Black and Brown people. The origins of the “war on drugs” are
found in racist policies 158 and statutes that were and continue to be
implemented by prosecutors. There is general agreement that the “war on

150. See PFAFF, supra note 11, at 206.
151. ALEXANDER, supra note 11.
152. TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015).
153. MEEK MILL FEATURING JAY-Z & RICK ROSS, What’s Free, on CHAMPIONSHIPS (Atlantic
Records 2018).
154. See, e.g., id. (“Tryna fix the system and the way that they designed it/ I think they want me
silenced (Shush)/ Oh, say you can see, I don’t feel like I’m free/ Locked down in my cell, shackled from
ankle to feet/ Judge bangin’ that gavel, turned me to slave from a king/ Another day in the bing, I gotta
hang from a string.”).
155. Butler, supra note 52, at 1435 (2016).
156. See ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 87; COATES, supra note 152, at 7–12.
157. ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 87.
158. See IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 13–20 (2019) (providing definitions for
racist policies and ideas). Dr. Kendi states that “[a] racist policy is any measure that produces or sustains
racial inequity between racial groups” and that “[a] racist idea is any idea that suggests one racial group
is inferior or superior to another racial group in any way.” Id. at 18, 20. This Article uses these terms, as
described, in this Section.
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drugs” is “the single most important explanation for mass incarceration.”159
A brief historical account captures this.
1. The Racist Origins of the War on Drugs
In 1971, President Richard Nixon launched the “war on drugs,” declaring
Blacks as public enemy number one: “you have to face the fact that the
whole problem is really the blacks.”160 In an attempt to conceal their racist
intent, the Nixon Administration made it appear that they were troubled by
the rise in the use of recreational drugs and thus agreed to market any
campaign as a public health issue.161 After all, “the key [was] to devise a
system that recognizes [their racist intent] while not appearing to.” 162
President Nixon argued that crime and violence in the community was a
consequence of a lenient criminal legal system. It was his belief that the
“solution to the crime problem is not the quadrupling of funds for any
governmental war on poverty but more convictions.”163 Thus, the real goal
behind the “war on drugs” since the Nixon Administration was to create a
strong carceral state to control and punish the Black and poor.164
In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan’s Administration aggressively continued
the “war on drugs.”165 President Reagan, who believed Blacks were inferior

159. BUTLER BOOK, supra note 21, at 46.
160. Roger Casement, Comment to Nixons’s Drug War—Re-Inventing Jim Crow, Targeting the
Counter Culture, THOM HARTMANN PROGRAM (Sept. 21, 2012, 10:47 AM) http://www.thomhartmann.c
om/forum/2012/09/nixons-drug-war-re-inventing-jim-crow-targeting-counter-culture#sthash.yO6ZEQ
vY.dpuf [https://perma.cc/XDE2-JVEP]; see also MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM DANIEL P.
MOYNIHAN TO PRESIDENT NIXON 4 (Jan. 16, 1970), https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/docum
ents/jul10/53.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LZK-GZ8Q] (“The incidence of anti-social behavior among young
black males continues to be extraordinarily high. Apart from white racial attitudes, this is the biggest
problem black Americans face, and in part it helps shape white racial attitudes. Black Americans injure
one another. Because blacks live in de facto segregated neighborhoods, and go to de facto segregated
neighborhoods, the socially stable elements of the black population cannot escape the socially
pathological ones. Routinely their children get caught up in the anti-social patterns of the others.”).
161. See PBS, Thirty Years of America’s Drug War: A Chronology, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.o
rg/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ [https://perma.cc/S2ZF-46P8]; DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND
MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF FAILURE 7 (1996).
162. Casement, supra note 160.
163. Emily Badger, Is This the End of ‘Tough on Crime’?, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014, 3:32 PM
CDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/09/is-this-the-end-of-tough-oncrime/ [https://perma.cc/5DU2-KS5H] (quoting KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE
POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 52 (2d ed. 2004)).
164. Larry Gabriel, Joining the Fight: Not Your Grandfather’s NAACP, DETROIT METRO TIMES
(Aug. 10, 2011), https://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/joining-the-fight/Content?oid=2148184 (“Look,
we understood we couldn’t make it illegal to be young or poor or black in the United States, but we
could criminalize their common pleasure . . . . We understood that drugs were not the health problem
we were making them out to be, but it was such a perfect issue . . . that we couldn’t resist it.”) (quoting
John Ehrlihcman, Nixon’s White House counsel).
165. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 60 (2d ed. 2006).
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to whites,166 developed a law enforcement strategy that targeted Blacks with
surgical precision. His strategy led to three major developments.
First, President Reagan created a narrative that America must “‘get
tough’ on street crime.”167 During his campaigns and media appearances,
President Reagan would claim, in a statement echoed by another
presidential candidate nearly forty years later, “we must make America safe
again . . . .”168 He fed the media a narrative that there is a “crime epidemic”
plaguing communities, that courts are not tough enough on criminals, and
that our laws, particularly drug laws, need to “crack[] down on hardened
criminals . . . .” 169 Television news media became dominated by stories
about crime as it parroted Reagan’s message that “street” crime is a major
threat to (white) civil society, and that the main perpetrators are Black
men.170
Second, to get tough on crime, President Reagan championed
federalizing more crimes and creating robust drug sentencing regimes.
Politicians followed his lead: they created new prisons, picked longer
sentences and limited judicial discretion to shorten them, added new federal
crimes, and created harsh laws to punish recidivists. 171 Specifically, as
Professor Angela J. Davis details exhaustively in her work, Congress added
new mandatory minimums that barred judges from exercising discretion
over sentencing. These mandatory minimums did not take into account
whether someone was a first-time offender or only played a minor part in
the offense—mandatory minimums meant that they still received lengthy
prison sentences.172
These “tough-on-crime” punishment regimes were driven by racial
stereotypes, particularly in laws addressing crack cocaine.173 Crack cocaine
was believed to be the preferred drug in the Black community, as “whites
strongly associated crack with . . . inner city blacks . . . .”174 The media
166. Tim Naftali, Ronald Reagan’s Long-Hidden Racist Conversation With Richard Nixon,
ATLANTIC (July 30, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/ronald-reagans-racist-co
nversation-richard-nixon/595102/ [https://perma.cc/LS6T-SJUK] (“To see those, those monkeys from
those African countries—damn them, they’re still uncomfortable wearing shoes!”).
167. Badger, supra note 163.
168. See, e.g., President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Crime and Criminal
Justice Reform (Sept. 11, 1982), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/radio-address-nation-c
rime-and-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/3N7S-MYHD].
169. Id.
170. See MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 172–74 (1st ed. 1999).
171. Butler Article, supra note 67, at 987–88.
172. Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration, 44 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1063, 1066 (2016).
173. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE (1999).
174. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1293
(1995). This Article also provides an in-depth analysis of the legislative history of the federal crack
sentencing laws.
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reported and perpetuated racist topes about crack cocaine that ultimately
were proven to be false.175 Congress instituted a mandatory sentence for
possession of crack cocaine, but not powder cocaine, with five- and ten-year
mandatory-minimum prison terms for first-time drug dealers,176 depending
on the type and quantity of the drug.177 This resulted in a one-hundred-toone disparity between penalties for crack and powder cocaine offenses,
meaning the distribution of just five grams of crack carried a mandatory
minimum five-year federal prison sentence, while distribution of five
hundred grams of powder cocaine carried the same sentence. Congress
didn’t study or evaluate the propriety of the one-hundred-to-one disparity
between the penalties for crack and powder cocaine offenses.178 Rather, this
disparity was the result of a “spitting contest” between political parties to
determine who was tougher on crime. 179 No supporting evidence—
scientific or otherwise—was presented to justify any disparity, much less
one set at one to a hundred. 180 Perhaps even worse, many states were
inspired by the federal government and followed its lead, codifying
mandatory-minimum sentencing regimes in law.181 Some states even passed
harsher drug sentencing laws, including three-strike laws.182
Finally, President Reagan entrusted prosecutors—an extension of the
executive—with even more power and control. The “consequences of
sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences was the transfer
of discretion and power from judges,”183 who President Reagan argued were
soft on crime, to prosecutors. It was made abundantly clear to prosecutors

175. See Crack Babies: Twenty Years Later, NPR (May 3, 2010, 12:00 PM ET), http://www.npr.or
g/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126478643 [https://perma.cc/RX6F-UYD7] (addressing the false
media reports about developmental disabilities in the children of crack cocaine users); DEBORAH J.
VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCURDY, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS
OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW 4–5 (2006) (dispelling all the common myths about
crack cocaine).
176. VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 175, at 2.
177. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 110–39 (1995).
178. BUTLER BOOK, supra note 21, at 38.
179. Id.
180. Many members of Congress made this point. Representative Barney Frank, for example,
described the statute as “the legislative equivalent of crack” saying “[i]t yields a short-term high, but
some dangerous long-term consequences.” Jacob V. Lamar Jr., Rolling Out the Big Guns: The First
Couple and Congress Press the Attack on Drugs, T IME, Sept. 22, 1986, at 25 (quoting Massachusetts
Democrat Barney Frank).
181. See Christopher Mascharka, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Exemplifying the
Law of Unintended Consequences, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 936 n.4 (2001) (citing various sources
regarding the mandatory minimum sentences imposed by the drug laws of thirty-seven states).
182. See KARA GOTSCH, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, “AFTER” THE WAR ON DRUGS: THE FAIR
SENTENCING ACT AND THE UNFINISHED DRUG POLICY REFORM AGENDA 2 (2011).
183. Davis, supra note 172, at 1070.
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that they were directly responsible to rein in “lawlessness.”184 To this end,
Congress authorized twelve new regional drug task forces, including over
one thousand new FBI and DEA agents and federal prosecutors.185
2. War Correspondence from Occupied Black America
Hip-hop culture prominently features a deep understanding of the
consequences of this selective prosecution. Carlton Ridenhour (a.k.a. Chuck
D) contrasted rap with mainstream news outlets; while mainstream news
routinely relies on white anxiety about Black criminality, rap conveys the
experiences of artists of color in their own words.186 Jay-Z recently argued
that the criminal legal system “stalks black people.”187 This harassment does
not go unnoticed and is represented in hip-hop terminology. For example,
Nipsey Hussle, among others, have talked about how they or their loved
ones “[caught] a case.” 188 This hip-hop slang for being arrested
demonstrates “the culture’s view of the almost arbitrary nature of criminal
justice. . . . The language connotes the same combination of responsibility
and happenstance as when one ‘catches’ the common cold.”189
Catching a case often results in punishment through incarceration. The
experiences of those in prison—and how the criminal legal system is used
to control Blacks—has been well documented in hip-hop and “[t]he portrait
is ugly.”190 To Nas, prison is “the belly of the belly of the beast” and “the
beast love to eat black meat / And got us n****s from the hood, hangin off
his teeth.”191
Hip-hop raises a larger question: whether punishment actually works.
Many have argued that the cruelty of putting people in cages is unnecessary.
184. See, e.g., President Ronald Reagan, Remarks Announcing Federal Initiatives Against Drug
Trafficking and Organized Crime (Oct. 14, 1982), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/rema
rks-announcing-federal-initiatives-against-drug-trafficking-and-organized-crime [https://perma.cc/VBF
6-HDKN].
185. MAUER, supra note 165, at 60–61.
186. See Veryl Pow, Rebellious Social Movement Lawyering Against Traffic Court Debt, 64
UCLA L. Rev. 1770, 1822 n.200 (2017) (“Carlton Ridenhour, professionally known as Chuck D, the
emcee of rap group Public Enemy, characterized rap as the Black CNN because unlike the
characterizations of Blacks as criminals by mainstream news outlets, rap is written by artists of color
whose content reflects experiences at the bottom.” (citing CHUCK D WITH YUSUF JAH, FIGHT THE
POWER: RAP, RACE, AND REALITY 256 (1998))).
187. Jay-Z, Opinion, The Criminal Justice System Stalks Black People Like Meek Mill, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/opinion/jay-z-meek-mill-probation.html
[https://perma.cc/XX4G-RDN8].
188. Nipsey Hussle Signs with Maybach Music, TRUE MAG. (2012), https://truemagazine.com/nipsey-hussle-signs-with-maybach-music-exclusively-announce-with-true-magazinehis-new-album-dropping-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/DT9C-EK9Y].
189. Butler Article, supra note 67, at 998.
190. Id. at 1014.
191. See NAS, DMX, METHOD MAN & JA RULE, Grand Finale, on BELLY (Def Jam Recordings
1998).
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Abolition focuses on addressing systemic problems to prevent the need for
incarceration. 192 Hip-hop approaches this same conclusion from two
premises. First, prison is cruel. It strips away a person’s dignity and
dehumanizes them. Hip-hop artist Common captured this sentiment stating,
“I think one of the things that I’ve experienced from meeting men and
women who were incarcerated was that they wanted to feel humanized.” 193
Second, prison does not deter because it is not viewed as legitimate.194 This
is why “[s]hout outs” to inmates—“expressions of love and respect to
them”195 —are commonplace in hip-hop music. Jay-Z, in “A Ballad for the
Fallen Soldier,” sends a “shout-out to my n****z that’s locked in jail /
P.O.W.’s (prisoner of war) that’s still in the war for real . . . They all winners
to me.”196 Professor Paul Butler makes this point crystal clear:
When a large percentage of the people you know, respect, and love
get locked up, them being locked up seems to say more about the state
than about the inmate. We are supposed to be disgusted with the
people the law labels as criminals, but that would mean we are
disgusted with one in three black men. The hip-hop community
consists of these young men and other people who know and love
them. It does not find them to be disgusting people. Just the
opposite.197
In their effort to rein in purported lawlessness, prosecutors gave their
adversaries in the “war on drugs” a face—a Black face. This resulted in
what Michelle Alexander poignantly calls “The New Jim Crow”—mass
incarceration.198

192. Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might Change Your Mind, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (April 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-abolition-ruthwilson-gilmore.html [https://perma.cc/7RXJ-UFSY].
193. Marcela Isaza, A Host of Celebrities Speak out on Criminal Justice Reform, AP NEWS (May
23, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/1b6023d6436d48f2b5e35c520f5f62d4 [https://perma.cc/EU9V-D
WMB].
194. This is a consequence of the “war on drugs.” As Fourth Amendment jurisprudence granted
greater leeway for police and prosecutorial errors and omissions, the legitimacy of convictions has
evaporated. See Thomas A. Durkin, Apocalyptic War Rhetoric: Drugs, Narco-Terrorism, and a Federal
Court Nightmare from Here to Guantanamo, 2 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 257, 263 (2012)
(“Boldfaced lying to justify the seizure of huge quantities of drugs, something once reserved for the
province of the state courts, became silently accepted by many prosecutors and judges in the federal
courts sadly permitting many deserving drug dealers a basis to go off to prison with a legitimate
complaint about the system.”).
195. Butler Article, supra note 67, at 984.
196. See JAY-Z, A Ballad for the Fallen Soldier, on THE BLUEPRINT2: THE GIFT & THE CURSE
(Roc-A-Fella 2002).
197. BUTLER BOOK, supra note 21, at 131.
198. See ALEXANDER, supra note 11.
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B. “The Black Body: The Clearest Evidence That America Is the Work of
Men”
In our criminal legal system “race matters.” 199 Indeed, “many of the
problems that plague the criminal justice system—mass incarceration, overcriminalization, and capital punishment, to name just a few—are only
intelligible through the lens of race.” 200 These problems can be directly
traced to prosecutors. They, among others,201 have subordinated Blacks at
every step. A close examination of the United States’ prison statistics
provides powerful proof.
The “war on drugs” resulted in a 628% explosion in the prison
population—the largest expansion of prison population in the free world—
and unprecedented racial disparities. 202 There are currently 2.2 million
people in America’s prisons and jails.203 Blacks account for approximately
half of the people in prison, even though we make up only about thirteen
percent of the overall population.204 While “one in every seventeen white
males can expect to go to prison in his lifetime, that likelihood increases to
one in every six Hispanic males,” and one in every three Black males.205
One explanation for this abhorrent statistic is that although Blacks represent
about fourteen percent of monthly drug users, we account for more than
thirty-eight percent of people incarcerated for drug use in state prisons.206
Although there is no evidence that Blacks are more likely to use or sell

199. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (2d ed. 2001); see also W.E.B. Du Bois, Of the Dawn of
Freedom, in THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 8, 8 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 2007) (“The problem of the
twentieth century is the problem of the color-line . . . .”).
200. I. Bennett Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and Policing in the Year 2044, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2019) [hereinafter Capers, Afrofuturism].
201. See, e.g., COATES, supra note 152, at 7–12 (discussing how police officers too have control
over the Black body).
202. See I. Bennett Capers, The Under-Policed, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 589, 591–93 (2016)
[hereinafter Capers, The Under-Policed]. The number of federal prisoners alone has grown by 800%
during the past three decades. “Over 80 percent of the increase in the federal prison population from
1985 to 1995 was due to drug convictions.” Kevin B. Zeese, Engaging the Debate: Reform vs. More of
the Same, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 465, 478–79 (2003).
203. See I. Bennett Capers, Defending Life, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH
PENALTY? 167, 179 (Charles Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012); SENT’G PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S.
CORRECTIONS 2 (2015), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corre
ctions.pdf.
204. See MAUER, supra note 170, at 124.
205. Capers, The Under-Policed, supra note 202, at 592 (citing SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT OF THE
SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 1 (2013),
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Race-and-Justi
ce-Shadow-ReportICCPR.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2R8-T23P]).
206. See E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2014 30 App. tbl.4 (2015), http://bjs
.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf [https://perma.cc/FG5G-WU6T]; see also Thomas, supra note
69.
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drugs, we are more likely to be arrested, charged, and convicted for those
crimes.
In a criminal legal system where more than 1.5 million people were
arrested for drug law violations in 2014—nearly 1.3 million of whom were
arrested for possession—the number of Black people “being roped into the
criminal justice machinery”207 is staggering.208 It is no wonder why hip-hop
artists such as Kendrick Lamar,209 Nobel laureate author Toni Morrison,210
movie director Jordan Peele, 211 and comedian Dave Chappelle, 212 among
others, complain about selective prosecution, which “sometimes seems to
border on paranoia.”213 As the old joke goes, “Just because you are paranoid
. . . doesn’t mean they’re not out to get you.”214
Race—the defendant’s, as well as that of the victim—is not just the
elephant in the room for our adversarial criminal legal system; it is the room,
the frame in which all criminal justice actors operate. As Professor Daniel
Epps contends, from choosing whom to prosecute to what sentence to seek,
race and other factors influence prosecutors’ decisions even when they
should be, “as a matter of law and justice . . . irrelevant.” Even for
prosecutors who never consciously consider race, unconscious racism
significantly shapes their assessment of what charges are appropriate. 215
Anti-Black bias affects the choice of whether to bring charges at all and

207.
208.

Capers, The Under-Policed, supra note 202, at 601.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014:
ARRESTS 2 (2015), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/persons-arrested/pe
rsons-arrested.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEF3-VSTF]; FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014: ARRESTS FOR DRUG ABUSE VIOLATIONS TABLE, FBI, https:
//ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/arrest-table.xls [https://perma.cc/79E
B-2GNB].
209. KENDRICK LAMAR, The Blacker the Berry, on TO PIMP A BUTTERFLY (Aftermath
Entertainment 2015).
210. Oliver Laughland, Toni Morrison: ‘I Want to See a White Man Convicted for Raping a Black
Woman’,
GUARDIAN
(April
20,
2015,
11:56
AM
EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/apr/20/toni-morrison-race-relations-america-criminaljustice-system [https://perma.cc/T4KH-A6JT] (“They don’t stop and frisk on Wall Street, which is
where they should really go.”).
211. Zach Sharf, ‘Get Out’: Jordan Peele Reveals the Real Meaning Behind the Sunken Place,
INDIEWIRE (Nov. 30, 2017, 1:33 PM), https://www.indiewire.com/2017/11/get-out-jordan-peele-explai
ns-sunken-place-meaning-1201902567/ [https://perma.cc/6DN8-7PHV] (discussing Jordan Peele’s
movie “Get Out,” in which Peele describes the “sunken place” as this: “No matter how hard we scream,
the system silences us”).
212. Tom Fairclough, Dave Chappelle and His White Friend Chip, YOUTUBE (Nov. 17, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OH4GMaNWdwU.
213. BUTLER BOOK, supra note 21, at 140.
214. Id.
215. See Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of the
Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 205–10 (2007).
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what penalty to seek. Epps demonstrates how both “anecdotal and statistical
evidence confirm that such discrimination persists.”216
Many scholars have acknowledged this troubling aspect of prosecutorial
adversarialism. 217 The need to win cases and induce plea bargains
encourages prosecutors, even unprejudiced prosecutors, to target racial
minorities. 218 This is because—as study after study suggests—juries and
judges are more easily persuaded, whether because of racial animus or
unconscious stereotypes, to convict Black and Brown people.219 Others,
such as Epps, have argued that discriminatory decisionmaking by
prosecutors—what he refers to as adversarial asymmetry—can perhaps be
prevented if the criminal process allowed more adversarialism.220 That is,
prosecutors should purely be focused on the maximization of punishment.221
Perhaps. But perhaps it would just lead to more of the same
“hyperadversarialism.”222 And when the defendant is Black, we know what
the same is.
To be Black in our criminal legal system means that prosecutors are more
likely to bring harsher charges against you, especially when it comes to

216. Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762. 801
(2016). (citing Starr & Rehavi, supra note 48, at 27–31 and COLE, supra note 173, at 143 (1999)). Epps
highlights one example that highlights discriminatory prosecution.
Georgia law permits (but does not require) district attorneys to seek an automatic life sentence
for a second drug offense. As of 1995, prosecutors appeared much more likely to use their
discretion to punish Black defendants: prosecutors “had invoked it against only 1 percent of
white defendants facing a second drug conviction, but against more than 16 percent of eligible
Black defendants.”
(quoting COLE, supra note 173, at 143 (1999)). The Georgia Supreme Court, despite this
statistical evidence, rejected an equal protection claim. Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560 (Ga.
1995).
217. See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1142
(2012) (“[T]he conditions under which implicit biases translate most readily into discriminatory
behavior are when people have wide discretion in making quick decisions with little accountability.
Prosecutors function in just such environments.”).
218. See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of
Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 651 (1998) (“Prosecutors will sometimes improve their trial win
rate or plea bargaining record by targeting minorities.”).
219. For reviews of such studies, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1616–51 (1985); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination:
Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 75–99 (1993); Cynthia
K.Y. Lee, Race and the Victim: An Examination of Capital Sentencing and Guilt Attribution Studies, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 533 (1998).
220. Epps, supra note 216, at 765–68 (arguing that more adversarial prosecutors with a focus on
maximizing punishment would solve a number of problems in the criminal legal system); see also id. at
803 (conceding that, under a maximization of punishment model, “some decisions by punishmentmaximizing prosecutors could still be infected by bias”).
221. Id. Admittedly, Epps explains that his “proposal is offered more as a thought experiment than
a reform proposal . . . .” Id. at 837.
222. See, e.g., Hadar Aviram, Legally Blind: Hyperadversarialism, Brady Violations, and the
Prosecutorial Organizational Culture, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (2013).
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charges carrying mandatory minimums.223 Black men are nearly twice as
likely as white men to be charged with an offense carrying a mandatory
minimum sentence.224 They also continue to receive longer sentences than
similarly situated white men by a substantial margin.225 Black women are
three times more likely than white women to be incarcerated;226 and Black
boys are seen as guiltier than white boys.227 Even worse, Black people are
more likely to be wrongfully convicted than any other race.228 Prosecutors
are often responsible for this serious injustice against Blacks.229
This discretionary disparity extends to the decision to seek the death
penalty. 230 Although it is unconstitutional to execute people with
intellectual disabilities,231 prosecutors selectively recognize the existence of
systemic racism to exploit the flaws of racist IQ tests and ask judges to add
five to fifteen points to the IQ scores of Black and Brown people.232 This
bump masks the disabilities of Black inmates, allowing their execution233—
and many states permit this practice.234
In addition, to be Black means you are under constant surveillance
because prosecutors advance contorted interpretations of our
Constitution.235 Black people thus face an increased likelihood—relative to
whites—of being stopped by the police, searched by the police, and being

223. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 48, at 27–31.
224. Id. at 28–29; see also Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 I OWA L. REV.
125, 192–93 (2008).
225. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN SENTENCING (2017), https://www.us
sc.gov/research/research-reports/demographic-differences-sentencing [https://perma.cc/E6LD-ZD5H].
226. See CARSON & SABOL, supra note 28, at 9.
227. See Black Boys Viewed as Older, supra note 29.
228. See generally Samuel R. Gross, Maurice Possley & Klara Stephens, Race and Wrongful
Convictions in the United States, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.law.umi
ch.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Race_and_Wrongful_Convictions.pdf [https://perma.cc/EHC7CGQ6] (examining vastly disproportionate rates of wrongful convictions).
229. See, e.g., infra III.A.3 (discussing the prosecutor’s role in wrongful convictions); Aviram,
supra note 222, at 6–8 (discussing the “tragic” and “infuriating” prosecutors who withheld Brady
evidence that resulted in the wrongful conviction of John Thompson for murder); BRYAN STEVENSON,
JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2014) (discussing the wrongful conviction of
Walter McMillian, a man sentenced to death for a murder he did not commit).
230. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987).
231. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the execution of individuals with
intellectual disabilities is unconstitutional).
232. See Robert M. Sanger, IQ, Intelligence Tests, “Ethnic Adjustments” and Atkins, 65 AM.
UNIV. L. REV. 87, 89 (2015); id. at 90 (“[A]fter increasing [a capital defendant’s IQ] test scores, the
prosecution argues that the defendant is not eligible for relief from execution under Atkins v. Virginia.”).
233. Id.
234. See id. at 109–11.
235. Toni Morrison, On the Backs of Blacks, TIME (Dec. 2, 1993), http://content.time.com/time/su
bscriber/article/0,33009,979736,00.html. Critical Race Theorist Devon Carbado convincingly shows
how Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was developed “on the backs of blacks.” See Carbado, supra note
50, at 148–49 (providing Fourth Amendment Supreme Court cases that involve black defendants).
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killed during a routine police encounter.236 This overpolicing predictably
results in positive feedback with aggressive and adversarial prosecution—
Black people are more likely to face prosecution because of racist policing,
and racist policing is legitimized by adversarial-minded prosecutors who
seek to win at all costs.
In sum, to be Black means to be punished because you are Black. When
race so predominates over other considerations as to become the entire
metaphorical room, everything else gets filtered through that room. This is
the greatest sin of prosecutorial adversarialism.
*

*

*

The concentration of power in prosecutors is not likely to change. How
they use that power, however, must change. The adversarial system works
poorly in practice for all, but especially Blacks. We must be more than
willing to reconsider basic structural arrangements in criminal justice, we
must be prepared to rebuild the system with an antiracist frame. The next
part does precisely that, imagining prosecutors as solely just actors in our
criminal legal system.
III. THE JUST PROSECUTOR
We are gifted by an ability to imagine a different world—to offer
alternative values—if only because we are not inhibited by the delusion that
we are well served by the status quo.237
–Charles R. Lawrence, III.
Hip-hop artist Nas once pondered what the criminal legal system would
look like if “[he] ruled the world.” 238 Nas would go on to claim that he
would “free all his sons” from prison by “open[ing] every cell in Attica,
send ‘em to Africa.”239 In 1971, there was a riot in New York’s Attica prison
after Black inmates discovered, among other things, racial biases with past

236. See, e.g., Camelia Simoiu, Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, Testing for Racial
Discrimination in Police Searches of Motor Vehicles, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK 15–16 (July 18, 2016);
Brandon Hasbrouck, Abolishing Racist Policing with the Thirteenth Amendment, 67 UCLA L. Rev.
1108, 1123 (2020) (“Yet even in cities with police forces that are more representative of their
populations’ racial diversity, the problem of police violence continues, in part because of fundamental
failings of even ‘community policing’ reforms.”).
237. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2239 (1992).
238. NAS FEATURING LAURYN HILL, If I Ruled the World (Imagine That), on IT WAS WRITTEN
(Sony Records 1996).
239. Id.
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prison sentences and parole decisions. 240 The uprising ended after state
troopers fired 3,000 rounds that resulted in the death of thirty-nine inmates;
an additional eighty inmates were treated for gunshot wounds.241 President
Nixon hoped that this would send a message to Black activists—the
“Angela Davis crowd,” as he put it—that challenged racist criminal justice
polices.242 Angela Y. Davis, a historian and former member of the Black
Panther Party, has advocated for the abolition of prisons and has challenged
experts to “creatively explor[e] new terrains of justice . . . .”243 Nas would
go on to quip, “imagine that.”244
This Part imagines that our criminal legal system had prosecutors who
were single mindedly focused on ensuring that “justice shall be done”—the
Supreme Court’s iconic description of prosecutors.245 It is my contention
that abolition constitutionalism, critical originalism, and liberation justice
can be used in constructing a prosecutor that improves the ideology and
administration of justice in the United States. A caveat is in order. This
project is an early attempt intended to bring theoretical clarity to what
precisely doing justice means. That is not to say that my construction—or
imagination—is exhaustive or even the most creative. The claim is more
limited, but I hope still profound. And, while many scholars have contended
that this inquiry is “an analytical dead end,” 246 an exploration of a few
approaches to justice will demonstrate alternatives to the unjust status quo.
Each of the following sections—abolition constitutionalism, critical
originalism, and liberation justice—provides an overview of each theory
240. See Becky Little, What the Nixon Tapes Reveal About the Attica Prison Uprising, HISTORY
(updated Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/nixon-tapes-attica-prison-uprisi ng
[https://perma.cc/G3W7-VSE3]. As Professor Bennett Capers writes, “As guards were ostensibly taking
steps to regain control of the prison, they killed several prisoners in retaliation and continued to assault
and beat prisoners after regaining control. When prosecutors declined to pursue charges against the
guards, prisoners and family members sued.” Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, supra note 20, at 1296
n.89. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the claims, citing the discretionary power of
prosecutors, concluding: “The primary ground upon which this traditional judicial aversion to
compelling prosecutions has been based is the separation of powers doctrine.” Inmates of Attica Corr.
Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973). The calcification of this doctrine in Supreme
Court jurisprudence is discussed in Section I.A. above.
241. Little, supra note 240.
242. Id.
243. Beth Potier, Abolish Prisons, Says Angela Davis: Questions the Efficacy, Morality of
Incarceration,
HARV.
GAZETTE
(Mar.
13,
2003),
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2003/03/abolish-prisons-says-angela-davis/
[https://perma.cc/CWX4-8HAY].
244. NAS, supra note 238.
245. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Indeed, the American Bar Association’s
Model Rules of Professional Conduct instruct that “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate,” and that this responsibility entails ensuring “that the
defendant is accorded procedural justice . . . .” MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017).
246. Bellin, supra note 36, at 1210; see also OTTO A. BIRD, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1967)
(discussing how philosophers have had little success defining “justice”).
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and offers concrete solutions on how prosecutors can ensure that justice is
done.
A. Abolition Constitutionalism
As a Black man, it is hard to start with the Constitution for several
reasons. It is that document that tells us, as Jay-Z poignantly states, “Threefifths of a man, I believe is the phrase.” 247 The three-fifths compromise
shows us that white supremacy birthed, nurtured, and financed American
democracy. 248 White supremacy “was reinforced during 250 years of
bondage.”249 And, despite the addition of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments, white supremacy “was further reinforced during
another century of Jim Crow” 250 and another fifty years of mass
incarceration, racial gerrymandering, voter suppression, and discriminatory
policies. The Constitution is, nevertheless, ours—it is “we who have been
the perfecters of this democracy.”251 Blacks “have never been the problem
but the solution[.]”252 It is through this frame that prosecutors can see how
they can establish constitutional norms in our criminal legal system.
Prosecutors take a solemn oath to uphold the Constitution and must
interpret and apply it in good faith.253 Previous scholars have addressed how
non-judicial government actors should approach constitutional
interpretation. 254 Their works examine how actors “should make
constitutional decisions in domains where courts have little say.”255 Some,
such as Professor Eric Fish, have offered important and significant insights
on how prosecutors should approach constitutional interpretation. 256 But
this is not enough. Restricting the Constitution’s anti-racism to a prohibition
247. MILL, supra note 153.
248. Ta-Nehisi Coates, Other People’s Pathologies, ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2014), https://www.thea
tlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/other-peoples-pathologies/359841/ [https://perma.cc/Q7XW-2ZC
R].
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Nikole Hannah-Jones, The 1619 Project, Our Democracy’s Founding Ideals Were False
When They Were Written. Black Americans Have Fought to Make Them True, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug.
14,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/black-history-americandemocracy.html [h ttps://perma.cc/S9AL-HVX9].
252. Id.
253. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; 4 U.S.C. § 101 (oath for state officers); 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (oath
for federal officers); see also John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25
CONST. COMMENT. 69, 110 (2008) (“Formally, no express clause of the Constitution singles out one
branch or the other for exclusive responsibility of constitutional assessment. Indeed, members of all
branches take an oath to uphold the Constitution.”).
254. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 62–63 (2005);
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004).
255. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 249.
256. Id. at 248–53.
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of racial animus has led to the “color-blind” racism which justifies the more
covert, systemic racism of the present day.257 We need prosecutors who are
abolitionists willing to carry on the necessary work of Reconstruction.258
This Article builds on Fish’s groundbreaking work and offers new
analyses through a critical race theory lens. 259 It does so by offering
antiracist guidelines for the situations in which prosecutors operate beyond
intra-government checks either due to a lack of oversight or “underdefined”
or “underenforced” constitutional rights. In these situations, prosecutors
should prioritize the antiracist potential of the Constitution and preserve
defendants’ constitutional rights even if judicial doctrine does not require it
and even if doing so lowers the chance of obtaining a conviction. This
Article focuses on three specific areas where abolition constitutionalism
demands that prosecutors implement constitutional norms—the charging
and plea bargaining process, individual rights and policing, and the postconviction arena.
1. The Charging and Plea Bargaining Process
There are many opportunities in the charging and plea bargain process
for prosecutors to promote and preserve equal protection and due process
norms. Prosecutorial discretion is especially great in the charging and plea
bargaining process where judges are often unable to effectively control
prosecutors’ actions. Indeed, because of separation-of-powers concerns and
limitations of judicial doctrine, there is very little judicial oversight at these
junctures. It is here where prosecutors must define and implement
defendants’ constitutional rights if those rights are to have any meaning,
especially for Blacks.
a. Charging Decisions and Equal Protection
Blacks systematically face more and harsher charges than whites—those
charges usually carry a mandatory-minimum sentence. 260 No one can
seriously contend that, in these circumstances, Blacks receive equal
257. See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND
THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (5th ed. 2018).

RACISM AND

258. See Roberts, supra note 37, at 71 (“[A]n abolitionist methodology identifies systemic
oppression by evaluating modern institutions’ antecedents in slavery and other freedom-denying
systems, as well as their current repressive impact.”).
259. Critical Race Theory (CRT) aims “to develop a jurisprudence that accounts for the role of
racism in American law and that works toward the elimination of racism as part of a larger goal of
eliminating all forms of subordination.” Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination
Law, and Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1331 n.7 (1991). For an
excellent overview of CRT, see Capers, Afrofuturism, supra note 200, at 20–30.
260. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 48, at 27–31.
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protection of the laws. We do not. Even worse, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to only
prohibit intentional or purposeful discrimination—“it does not reach
policies that have discriminatory effects.”261 Indeed, the Court has created a
Catch-22:
Equal protection is violated only when a prosecutor purposefully
enforces a facially neutral statute against a person based on an
impermissible factor such as race, but a defendant can only obtain
evidence needed to prove such purposeful discrimination by
establishing a substantial threshold showing of purposeful
discrimination. In other words, a defendant can only prove that she
was selected for prosecution in federal court rather than state court
based on her race with evidence that will normally be in the
possession of federal prosecutors. This evidence, however, is not
discoverable because of the presumption of constitutional validity of
discretionary prosecutorial decisionmaking.262
There are, however, many criminal laws—for example, drug laws and death
penalty laws—that have discriminatory effects.263
To combat these obvious and provable discriminatory practices,
prosecutors can establish anti-racist 264 policies and thus reinforce equal
protection norms.265 Prosecutors bear some of the responsibility for giving
the “war-on-drugs” a Black face but have the power to change their role in
that process moving forward. For example, they can decide not to charge
non-violent drug offenders, irrespective of race. Moreover, as Fish argues,
prosecutors can also establish a data-collection system to analyze charging
and sentencing decisions and the reasons for those decisions, which could
help detect systemic bias. 266 Tracking this data allows prosecutors to
identify racial discrepancies in their decisionmaking.267
In addition, Congress and state legislatures should create independent
review committees specifically instructed to consider any allegations of

261. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 286–87 (citing Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976)); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312–13 (1987).
262. Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for
Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1323 (1997).
263. See supra Section II.
264. This includes the idea that there is nothing right or wrong with any racial group.
265. See KENDI, supra note 158, at 13–20.
266. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 288. Some prosecutors’ offices have
already implemented such a system. See For Prosecutors, VERA INST. OF JUST.,
https://www.vera.org/unlocking-the-black-box-of-prosecution/for-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/NQ9SVHLW].
267. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 288.
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individual or systemic racial bias in charging or sentencing decisions.268
Committee membership should be determined on a similar basis to that of
independent redistricting committees, consisting of many different
stakeholders, including members of the community. 269 It should not be
solely composed of prosecutors. That’s like letting the police run
disciplinary tribunals.270
All of these efforts will help promote and preserve equal protection
norms by requiring prosecutors to approach decisions implicating
constitutional rights with a commitment to equal justice, fairness, and
neutrality.
b. Due Process and Plea Bargaining
The plea-bargaining process presents another—and perhaps the most
significant—vehicle to establish due process norms. Plea bargaining is
largely unsupervised by judges and free from juries’ democratic check on
executive power: prosecutors exercise unilateral control over this process.
Over 95% of criminal cases are resolved through plea bargaining. Because
the “great majority of cases are resolved through a shadow system of private
settlement in which prosecutors’ offices decide what terms to offer
defendants,”271 it is of extraordinary importance that prosecutors preserve
defendants’ constitutional protections. Prosecutors can do this in two
important ways.
First, prosecutors should extend Brady to plea bargaining. Defendants
should be entitled to all material exculpatory and mitigating information
about the government’s evidence, rather than merely being entitled to it
before trial, as Brady v. Maryland requires. 272 Most courts have not
extended Brady to cases where the defendant pleads guilty before trial.273
Instead, they should follow the lead of federal district court Judge Emmet
G. Sullivan, whose standing Brady order directs prosecutors in each case
“to produce to defendant in a timely manner any evidence in its possession
268. See U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL § 9-10.130 (2015) (describing such a review committee in the
federal death penalty context).
269. See Shane Grannum, Note, A Path Forward for Our Representative Democracy: State
Independent Preclearance Commissions and the Future of the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County v.
Holder, 10 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 95, 119–22 (2018) (describing the methods that
Arizona and California have implemented to ensure the independence of their state redistricting
commissions while including stakeholder voices).
270. See Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 566 (2019)
(exploring the effects of methods for selecting the arbitrator on police disciplinary appeals, with
restrictions imposed by police union contracts often resulting in reduced discipline for officer
misconduct).
271. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 289.
272. 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963).
273. See Baer, supra note 44, at 13–14.
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that is favorable to defendant and material either to defendant’s guilt or
punishment. This government responsibility includes producing, during
plea negotiations, any exculpatory evidence in the government’s
possession.” 274 Without that extension, and coupled with prosecutors’
coercive power in plea negotiations, Brady is effectively meaningless.275
This is of particular concern in the Black community because in far too
many instances, prosecutors obtain wrongful convictions after failing to
disclose Brady material. Even worse, prosecutors usually require
defendants—as a condition of the plea agreement—to waive their right to
exculpatory evidence.276
Second, as Professor Bennett Capers argues, the due process norms of
plea bargaining must be revitalized.277 In far too many cases, defendants
who are factually innocent plead guilty—criminal justice’s “dark secret.”278
This is because prosecutors use coercive measures—they threaten
additional charges and lengthier sentences, or even charges against family
members—and the specter of prison rape as a negotiating tool. 279 All of
these practices must cease; prosecutors should ensure fundamental fairness
in the plea bargaining process. A line of Supreme Court decisions reads “the
Due Process Clause as capacious, and as a catch-all right to protect the
innocent as well as the guilty, to ensure accuracy, to level the playing field
[between prosecutors and defendants], and even to further the goal of racial
equality.”280 These cases—many involving Black defendants—stand for the
proposition that due process requires a baseline of fundamental fairness:
confessions obtained by torture, 281 coercion, or deceit, 282 or threats of
additional charges283 or to the defendant’s family 284 violate due process.
And, although the Supreme Court has narrowed its interpretation of the Due
274. Emmet G. Sullivan, Standing Brady Order, at 2–3, https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/sites/dcd/fi
les/StandingBradyOrder_November2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YFE-PPA2] (emphasis added). This
order satisfies the requirement recently added to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that each
district court promulgate a model order for reminding prosecutors of their Brady obligations—a
requirement that does not go far enough. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(f)(2).
275. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 291.
276. 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR H. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
586 (4th ed. 2015) (“A term in a plea agreement waiving any right to Brady disclosure as part of a plea
bargain is enforceable.”).
277. Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, supra note 20, at 1299–1300.
278. John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who
Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 165 (2014) (describing evolution of “plea bargaining system
whereby extremely coercive ‘deals’ were offered to defendants both in terms of incentives to forego trial
and avoidance of much harsher punishment”).
279. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1284–88 (2011).
280. Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, supra note 20, at 1300 (emphasis added).
281. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1936).
282. See Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
283. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 535 (1961).
284. See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
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Process Clause in this context—a prosecutor can threaten to bring additional
charges in order to induce a plea285—prosecutors should implement these
due process norms to realize the abolitionist goals of the Reconstruction
Amendments.
2. Individual Rights and the Fourth Amendment
There is something very real and raw about the way hip-hop artist J. Cole
searches in lyrics to describe the Black experience living under police
surveillance and control. In his track “Be Free,” J. Cole asks, “Are we all
alone, fighting on our own?” 286 He then pleads, “Please give me a
chance . . . Don’t just stand around.”287 The genius of these lyrics—written
in response to Ferguson, Missouri police killing Michael Brown288—is that
the message is unequivocally clear: the law, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, does not require Black lives to matter to police. But even where
courts allow police to disregard the spirit of the Bill of Rights, prosecutors
retain the power to maintain its protections.
The Supreme Court has granted police officers permission to racially
profile, 289 to conduct pretextual stops, 290 and to use excessive force. 291
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissents highlight a disturbing trend in our
constitutional jurisprudence—specifically, the Court’s reluctance to restrain
the prosecution of Black people with the Fourth Amendment. For example,
in Utah v. Strieff, 292 she cited a whole shelf of Black literature to
demonstrate the Court’s complicity in creating a criminal “justice” system
that is “anything but”293 for Black and Brown people.294 She also discussed
how Strieff—a case involving a white defendant—will be used to increase

285. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
286. J. COLE, Be Free, on BE FREE (By Storm 2014).
287. Id.
288. See Kory Grow, J. Cole Mourns Michael Brown in Somber New Song ‘Be Free’, ROLLING
STONE (Aug. 15, 2014, 1:32 PM ET), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/j-cole-mournsmichael-brown-in-somber-new-song-be-free-169276/ [https://perma.cc/9QBV-W3WR] (“‘Be Free’ is
Cole’s response to the police shooting of an unarmed African-American teenager, Michael Brown, in
the St. Louis suburb of Ferguson, Missouri.”).
289. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810–13 (1996); see also Carbado, supra note 50, at
129–30; Johnson, supra note 50, at 1009–45.
290. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811; see also Joh, supra note 51, at 209.
291. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
292. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (“We hold that the evidence Officer Fackrell seized as part of
his search incident to arrest is admissible because his discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the
connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from Strieff incident to arrest.”).
293. Id. at 2071 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
294. Id. (“We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted by police are
‘isolated.’ They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can
breathe in this atmosphere.”).
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African-Americans’ encounters with the criminal justice machinery.295 In
Mullenix v. Luna, 296 Justice Sotomayor stated that the Court has
“sanction[ed] a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing” thereby
“render[ing] the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.” 297
Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to interpret the Fourth
Amendment in a manner that would strengthen individual rights for Black
people, prosecutors can (and should) choose a different path—a path that
reins in police powers and acknowledges the humanity and equal rights of
Black people. Prosecutors can be actively antiracist by expanding
constitutional protections beyond the judiciary’s mere color-blindness.
Even when the Court defines a constitutional right too narrowly, it seldom
requires a prosecutor to infringe that right. For example, when evidence
suggests that a police officer engaged in racial profiling or conducted a
pretextual stop, prosecutors should exercise their discretion to either not
bring charges, exclude tainted evidence, or conduct an independent
investigation against the police officer for civil rights violations. This would
fulfill the vision of the Framers: the Fourth Amendment intentionally makes
it harder for police to do their jobs. 298 Prosecutors, as abolition
constitutionalists, should no longer stand around, as J. Cole pleaded,
allowing the ends to justify the means.
3. Post-Conviction Innocence and Illegal Sentences
In his groundbreaking hit “Testify,” hip-hop artist Common uses prose
to highlight Black innocence in our criminal legal system.299 He speaks to
the manner in which the police use confidential informants, snitches, and
coercive tactics that lead to the wrongful conviction of innocent Black
people for various crimes. Interestingly and, perhaps, most compellingly,
Common specifically identifies the prosecutor’s role in wrongful
convictions. He fires, “that’s when the prosecutor realized what happened,”
referring to the wrongful conviction of an innocent Black man; but still, the
prosecutor did nothing.300 What Common accomplished through lyrics in
295. Id. at 2070 (“[I]t is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this type of
scrutiny.”). The Court’s decision tells “everyone, white and black, guilty and innocent, that an officer
can verify your legal status at any time. It says that your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse
the violation of your rights. It implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a
carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.” Id. at 2070–71.
296. 577 U.S. 7 (2015) (holding that a police officer was entitled to qualified immunity for fatally
shooting a fleeing suspect four times despite his superior officer’s instruction to stand by).
297. Id. at 26 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
298. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 49, at 1638 (“The framers of the Constitution were deeply
distrustful of executive power and of the police.”).
299. COMMON, Testify, on BE (GOOD Music 2005).
300. Id.
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“Testify” is nothing short of brilliant—he identified an important problem,
wrongful convictions, and the actors best positioned to bring about a
solution, prosecutors.
All of the many exoneration studies examining wrongful convictions
indicate that Black people are significantly more likely to be wrongfully
convicted of most crimes, including murder, sexual assault, and drugs.301
Innocent Black people are—relative to innocent white people—about seven
times more likely to be convicted of murder, three and a half times more
likely to be convicted of sexual assault, and twelve times more likely to be
convicted of drug crimes.302 In total, Black people make up the majority of
the over 3,700 people exonerated through 2016.303 Many of these wrongful
convictions were because of prosecutorial and police misconduct, which
was critically examined in “When They See Us”—the Netflix miniseries
based on the events leading to the exoneration of five wrongfully convicted
teenagers for the brutal rape and assault of a woman in Central Park, New
York. 304 Such actual innocence and wrongful sentences claims raise
significant constitutional concerns involving due process, separation of
powers, and cruel and unusual punishment.305
Prosecutors’ control over the ultimate relief provided to wrongfully
convicted or sentenced defendants is well documented, making them the
most logical party to redress the rights of wrongfully convicted or
imprisoned people. 306 Prosecutorial responses to these types of claims
influence their outcomes.307 Therefore, as Professor Daniel Medwed argues,
“prosecutors should take all reasonable steps to verify” the viability of an
actual innocence or unlawful sentence claim, and—upon confirmation—

301. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 228.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1.
304. See When They See Us, supra note 3.
305. See Brandon Hasbrouck, Saving Justice: Why Sentencing Errors Fall Within the Savings
Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), 108 GEO. L. J. 287, 288 (2019) (arguing that a sentencing error is any error
in statutory interpretation by courts that alters the statutory range Congress prescribed for punishment—
the ceiling or the floor—because such an error raises separation-of-powers and due process concerns).
306. See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 132 (2004) (“[T]he reaction of prosecutors to post-conviction
innocence claims has had and will continue to have a great bearing on whether actually innocent
prisoners receive justice.”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After
Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 171, 186–87 (2005) (noting that the “prosecutor’s consent to a motion
for a new trial may have persuasive effect”); Bob Herbert, Justice, at Long Last, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
1998, at A31 (discussing the case of Jeffrey Blake, a convicted Black man freed after Brooklyn District
Attorney Charles Hynes joined in a motion to the Court to set aside the guilty verdict).
307. See Medwed, supra note 306, at 128 (citation omitted) (“[W]here post-conviction innocence
claims are unrelated to DNA testing, such as those involving statements by previously unknown
witnesses or confessions by the actual perpetrator, the prosecution can influence how courts will resolve
the claims by deciding whether to cooperate with the defense . . . .”).
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“assist in exonerating that defendant.” 308 Prosecutors can do so by
facilitating a post-conviction investigation into the claim’s merits, readily
consenting to scientific testing of evidence—for example DNA testing—
and, when appropriate, joining the defendant’s post-conviction motion for
relief.309 Prosecutors who want to realize the abolitionist promise of the
Reconstruction Amendments—safeguarding liberty against systems of
racial subjugation—can readily do so by setting aside their adversarialism
in post-conviction claims.310 Towards this end, prosecutors could, among
other things, lobby for more robust post-conviction testing statutes and
support forensic evaluations when new techniques are developed.
B. Critical Originalism
At my barber shop, we often debate the greatest conscious hip-hop album
of all time, “where political, social and cultural issues are hashed out in
verse.”311 Although there is never a consensus, one album always in the
conversation is Lauryn Hill’s “The Miseducation of Lauryn Hill.” On one
of her tracks, “Lost Ones,” Hill describes my relationship with originalism:
“My emancipation don’t fit your equation.” 312 A statement of Black
resistance against elderly white infallibility. Allow me to briefly explain.
Originalism—as a mode of constitutional interpretation—almost always
assumes that the meaning of any particular constitutional provision is fixed
at the historical moment of its adoption. Originalism thus seeks to “obstruct
modernity”313 and “to prevent current majorities from diluting or altering
the values of the past.”314 Preserving the values of the past, however, also

308. See Medwed, supra note 131, at 48.
309. Id.
310. Professor Daniel S. Medwed, a leading expert on wrongful convictions, observed the
following disturbing trend amongst prosecutors:
One study by the Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law demonstrated
that prosecutors had consented to post-conviction DNA testing in less than half the cases in
which DNA testing ultimately exonerated an inmate. The annals of criminal law are also rife
with tales of prosecutors behaving defensively even when faced with strong evidence of
innocence exculpating the convicted. At the extreme end of the spectrum, prosecutors have
apparently destroyed evidence to maintain a trial result; less extreme but still deeply worrisome,
prosecutors confronted with the likelihood of a wrongful conviction in their jurisdiction have
more than once concocted revised theories of the case that bear scant resemblance to the
approach at trial in order to rationalize the continued incarceration of a defendant.
Id. at 50–51 (citations omitted).
311. Teresa Wiltz, We the Peeps: After Three Decades Chillin’ in the Hood, Hip-Hop Is Finding
Its Voice Politically, WASH. POST, June 25, 2002, at C2.
312. LAURYN HILL, Lost Ones, on THE MISEDUCATION OF LAURYN HILL (Columbia 1998).
313. See Antonin Scalia, Modernity and the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER
OLD CONSTITUTIONS 313, 315 (Eivind Smith ed., 1995).
314. Jamal Greene, Originalism’s Race Problem, 88 DENV. L. REV. 517, 521 (2011).
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preserves its racism. 315 As Professor Jerome Culp writes, [Originalism]
ask[s] black concerns to defer to white concerns. . . . ‘Defer to the past’ is
the implicit message. Listen to the wiser and greater (and whiter)
founders.”316 Professor Jamal Greene perfectly captures my feelings as a
Black man: “a narrative of restoration is deeply alienating; what America
has been is hostile to my personhood and denies my membership in its
political community.” 317 This section, however, serves as a necessary bridge
to allow different minds to find common ground on important issues
concerning the prosecutor and race.318
Specifically, there can be common understanding on the statutory
interpretation front. Originalism in statutory construction is the notion that
legal texts mean what they meant at the time of their enactment. 319 It
requires “immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of
the time”320 to determine the meaning of a statutory provision. This mode
of interpretation provides prosecutors two important tools to do justice.
First, originalism provides context—it confirms that the criminalization of
the use of drugs was driven by racial considerations as “no one”321 at the
time these criminal statutes were enacted would have believed otherwise.
Second, under originalist principles, prosecutors need not prosecute nonviolent drug offenses under federal law.

315. Id. at 522.
316. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original
Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 75.
317. Greene, supra note 314, at 521.
318. Originalism also presents an opportunity for common ground in the fight for broader
interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments. See, e.g., Christopher W. Schmidt, Originalism and
Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 33, 38
(2018) (“The people who framed the Fourteenth Amendment and advocated for its passage believed that
Congress, using its Section 5 power, would play a leading role in protecting constitutional rights.”);
Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493, 502 (2013)
(“There is, however, a strong textual and historical argument for recognizing an equality component in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause under both original intent and original public meaning
theories of originalism.”); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81
VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) (arguing that the Reconstruction Congress made clear the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment through its passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1875). But see Thomas
B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627,
1631 (2013) (“[I]f the normative arguments in favor of originalism do not hold water when applied to
the Fourteenth Amendment, then, as a practical matter, the normative appeal of originalism is severely
diminished.”).
319. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 56, at 78–82.
320. Scalia, supra note 57, at 856.
321. Justice Antonin Scalia often applied “no one” originalism to issues.

2021]

THE JUST PROSECUTOR

675

1. Our Racialized Drug Laws
Our drug laws have racist origins. This understanding was conveyed to
me through my mother when she gave me “the talk”322 and through hip-hop
music. For example, Tupac Shakur (a.k.a. 2Pac), one of the greatest hip-hop
artists of all time, observed this in his emotional hit “Changes.”323 There, he
implores the United States to make significant changes to criminal justice
policy. Tupac discusses how all he sees are “racist faces” in power and that
the “penitentiary’s packed and it’s filled with blacks” because “[t]hey got a
war on drugs so the police can bother me.”324 And, yet, despite how our drug
laws have been racialized, he “see[s] no changes” and concludes, “[s]ome
things’ll never change.”325 Originalism confirms these points.
For most of the history of the United States, drugs were legal, until
legislatures criminalized opium, cocaine, and marijuana for invidious—and
racist—purposes.326 Our courts have repeatedly recognized the association
between the enactment of criminal drug laws and hostility directed at Black
and Brown people.327 Throughout our history, media reports tapping into
racial fears have stoked panic in support of racially-biased criminal drug
legislation. Legal scholars such as Paul Butler, Gabriel Chin, and David
Sklansky, and Michael Pinard provide detailed historical accounts that
demonstrate that once drugs were associated with unpopular segments of
society, criminal sanctions were imposed.328
In 1875, the criminalization of drugs began in San Francisco.329 It started
with widespread fear that Chinese men were using opium to seduce white

322. “For generations, black and brown parents have given their children ‘the talk’ – instructing
them never to run down the street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even think of
talking back to a stranger – all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them.” Utah v.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
323. 2PAC, Changes, on GREATEST HITS (Amaru Records 1998).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 355 (1993)
(“Cocaine raised the specter of the wild Negro, opium the devious Chinese, morphine the tramps in the
slums.”).
327. See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 774 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (“Early in our
nation’s history, legislatures were motivated by racial discrimination to differentiate between crimes
committed by whites and crimes committed by blacks.”), rev’d on other grounds, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.
1994); id. at 774–76.
328. See, e.g., BUTLER BOOK, supra note 21, at 44; Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and
the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 257–58 (2002);
Sklansky, supra note 174, at 1292–94 (1995); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 514 (2010).
329. Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 501,
507 (1990) (arguing that an 1875 ordinance closing Chinese opium dens in San Francisco was “not
passed out of any concern for addiction, but out of a concern that Chinese opium dens were being
frequented by white women and men of ‘good family.’”).
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women, enslave white women, and destroy white men. 330 The federal
government shared these unfounded concerns and began to regulate opium
with the 1909 Opium Exclusion Act.331
In the early 1900s, the pattern repeated with concerns that “Black cocaine
fiends [were] raping white women or going on murderous sprees while they
were high on the drug.” 332 Doctors claimed that cocaine gave Blacks
superhuman powers—even that several bullets could not stop “cocainecrazed negroes.” 333 Because of this racialized hysteria, the federal
government enacted the Harrison Act in 1914, which criminalized the
distribution of cocaine.334
Criminalization tracks racism. As with cocaine, white legislators’
irrational racist beliefs about Mexicans and Blacks triggered regulation—
and criminalization—of marijuana. On legislative floors during the early
1900s, state legislative representatives contended that “[a]ll Mexicans are
crazy, and this . . . [marijuana] is what makes them crazy.”335 Similarly,
Blacks were accused of using marijuana to seduce white women and, when
under the influence of marijuana, committing violent crimes.336 State and
local governments were the first to react to racist rhetoric about marijuana,
with California prohibiting the sale or possession of marijuana in 1913. 337
By 1937, every state criminalized marijuana possession.338 These attitudes
persisted, allowing Nixon and later administrations to use the “war on
drugs” to control and punish Blacks.
Against this historical backdrop, prosecutors can fully appreciate the
racist origins of many of our criminal drug laws. The vestiges of those racist
330. Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Crack in Context: Politics and Media in the Making of
a Drug Scare, 16 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 535, 557 (1989) (“The campaign against smoking opium . .
. included lurid newspaper accusations of Chinese men drugging white women into sexual slavery.”).
331. Opium Exclusion Act, ch. 100, 35 Stat. 614 (1909).
332. BUTLER BOOK, supra note 21, at 44.
333. Williams, supra note 61.
334. Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914) (addressing the importation of opium
for medicinal purposes and the interstate trade of cocaine, morphine, and heroin); see also United States
v. Moore, 486 F. 2d 1139, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, J., dissenting) (“Although possession was not
itself made criminal, it was to be treated as prima facie evidence of the proscribed acts.”).
335. Charles Whitebread, Speech to the California Judges Association 1995 Annual Conference:
The History of the Non-Medical Use of Drugs in the United States, https://www.druglibrary.net/schaffer
/History/whiteb1.htm [https://perma.cc/3QRD-SQEH].
336. See Malik Burnett & Amanda Reiman, How Did Marijuana Become Illegal in the First
Place?, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE (Oct. 8, 2014), https://drugpolicy.org/blog/how-did-marijuana-becomeillegal-first-place [https://perma.cc/L7MD-MVQF] (“During hearings on marijuana law in the 1930’s,
claims were made about marijuana’s ability to cause men of color to become violent and solicit sex from
white women.”); JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF MARIHUANA: POLITICS AND
IDEOLOGY OF DRUG CONTROL IN AMERICA 52 (1983) (detailing the transference of stereotypes from
Mexican to Black users of marijuana in New Orleans and the Southwest).
337. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005).
338. STEVEN W. BENDER, RUN FOR THE BORDER: VICE AND VIRTUE IN U.S.-MEXICO BORDER
CROSSINGS 97 (2012).
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policies continue to plague our criminal legal system. Prosecutors, however,
can change the complexion—literally and figuratively—of our criminal
legal system. They can do this by treating drug crimes, especially possession
crimes, as a medical problem—not a criminal justice problem. Indeed,
prosecutors—federal and state—have responded to the recent opioid
epidemic in precisely this manner.339 But this crisis has a white face.340
The difference is stark compared with the response of “harsh sentencing
laws” and “harsher rhetoric” to the crack epidemic in the 1990s, which the
government gave a Black face.341 In many police departments, heroin abuse
is seen as a crisis that merits medical, rather than criminal treatment.342 The
National District Attorneys Association recently released a white paper
concerning the opioid crisis arguing that a gentler and more humane war on
drugs is necessary. 343 The key takeaway is that prosecutors believe the
opioid epidemic to be a health crisis and contend that the criminal legal
system should treat it as such by declining to prosecute non-violent
offenders.344
This same response is necessary for all non-violent criminal drug
offenders. Such programs find support in originalist principles.

339. See Barbara Fedders, Opioid Policing, 94 IND. L.J. 389, 431 (2019) (“The arresting officer
sends the arrest record to the misdemeanor or felony prosecutor—these offices maintain the records and
the authority to charge the arrested person. However, the presumption is that charges will not be filed if
the individual completes both the initial screening as well as a full intake assessment with LEAD case
managers within thirty days of the referral.”); C. Currin Hammond & Shannon Taylor, Personal
Reflections on the Opioid Epidemic and Legal Responses, 20 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 175, 182 (2017)
(“It is unrealistic to think that Public Safety and the Courts do not have a role to play in this Opioid
epidemic, but the definition of that role is delicate—the attempt to balance the interests of a public health
crisis revolving around a criminal activity.”). But see Khiara M. Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the
Opioid Epidemic: White Privilege and the Criminalization of Opioid Use During Pregnancy, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 770, 808–09 (2020) (“While these guilty pleas do not create a legal precedent that is binding on
future cases, they nevertheless result in the conviction of pregnant women for crimes involving substance
use during pregnancy.”) (citation omitted).
340. Ekow N. Yankah, When Addiction Has a White Face, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/opinion/when-addiction-has-a-white-face.html
[https://perma.cc/L82B-8TK7]; Clyde Haberman, Heroin, Survivor of War on Drugs, Returns with New
Face, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/us/heroin-survivor-of-waron-drugs-returns-wit h-new-face.html [https://perma.cc/E4RF-RL5J]. According to the American
Medical Association, ninety percent of the people who have tried heroin for the first time in recent years
are white. Id.
341. See, e.g., BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD, supra note 53, at 71 (“U.S. police officers have super
powers . . . The police have been granted these powers [by] . . . the United States Supreme Court . . . .”).
342. Id.; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, In Heroin Crisis, White Families Seek Gentler War on
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/us/heroin-war-on-drugsparents.html [htt ps://perma.cc/2ENJ-5A8W].
343. NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: A STATE AND LOCAL PROSECUTOR
RESPONSE (Oct. 12, 2018), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NDAA-Opioid-White-Paper.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/TB6A-N3V9].
344. Id.
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2. An Originalist Hook: Diversion Programs
One of the most underrated and underappreciated hip-hop tracks is Mos
Def’s “Mathematics.” His goal is to use numbers as lyrics to expose
profound racial disparities in our criminal legal system. Mos Def discusses
the consequences of a drug conviction—from gross punishment, threestrikes laws, to six million people being under correctional supervision—
and then asks, “Why did one straw break the camel’s back?” 345 His
response, “Here’s the secret / The million other straws underneath it / It’s
all mathematics.”346 The criminal legal system is broken precisely because
it treated non-violent Black drug offenders as criminals instead of addicts in
need of medical treatment or hustlers in need of economic opportunity. Hiphop tells this story vividly through experience. And now, many prosecutors
have the power to change the plot.347
There is a consensus building among scholars, experts, and courts that
prosecutors should implement and support robust diversion programs for
non-violent offenders, especially drug offenders. 348 As background,
diversion programs—sometimes referred to as deferred prosecution or pretrial diversion—provide a conditional opportunity for defendants to have
their charges dismissed.349 Defendants might be required to make amends
through restitution or community service or improve themselves through
rehabilitation, drug or alcohol treatment, or a program for education or
employment. When the diversion program’s requirements are met, the
prosecutor dismisses the charges. 350 Indeed, scholars have argued
persuasively that prosecutors should consider diversion programs as a

345. See MOS DEF, Mathematics, on BLACK ON BOTH SIDES (Rawkus Records 1999).
346. Id.
347. But see Beth McCann, Courtney Oliva & Ronald Wright, Prosecution Office Culture and
Diversion Programs, 11 CRIM. L. PRAC. 33, 33 (2020) (“A prosecutor who wants to expand the use of
diversion programs must find partners in the community to fund these initiatives and measure their
success. They must also achieve buy-in from other actors in the local criminal justice system, including
judges and law enforcement. Just as important, chief prosecutors must understand and address the
internal culture of their own offices, convincing their line prosecutors to embrace and willingly utilize
diversion programs with enthusiasm and sound judgment.”).
348. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/08
/12/smart-on-crime.pdf [https://perma.cc/TWA6-7GF8] (“Incarceration is not the answer in every
criminal case. Across the nation, no fewer than 17 states have shifted resources away from prison
construction in favor of treatment and supervision as a better means of reducing recidivism. . . . Federal
law enforcement should encourage this approach. In appropriate instances involving non-violent
offenses, prosecutors ought to consider alternatives to incarceration, such as drug courts, specialty
courts, or other diversion programs.”).
349. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 65, at 321–22.
350. Id.
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method to end mass incarceration. 351 Originalism provides an important
missing hook to the discussion.
Federal prosecutors can leverage statutes, such as the Speedy Trial
Act, 352 to create and sustain diversion programs for non-violent drug
offenders (and really non-violent offenders in general). The Speedy Trial
Act, specifically § 3161(h)(2), allows for the exclusion of “[a]ny period of
delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the
Government pursuant to written agreement with the defendant, with the
approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to
demonstrate his good conduct.”353 The plain text of this provision “give[s]
prosecutors the ability to defer prosecution of individuals charged with
certain non-violent criminal offenses to encourage rehabilitation.”354
The legislative history further demonstrates that § 3161(h)(2) was
intended to encourage practices that had been ongoing in certain courts,
which permitted non-violent offenders to enter into a diversion program.
Specifically, the Senate Judiciary Committee cited two successful
projects—one in New York City, the Manhattan Court Employment Project,
and the other in the District of Columbia, Project Crossroads–as examples
of the types of deferred prosecution it intended with this provision. 355 These
projects intervened after a defendant’s arrest, offering counseling, medical
treatment, and vocational opportunities for ninety days and dismissing all
charges if the defendant cooperated.356 Both of these projects “convert[ed]
a defendant’s arrest from a losing to a winning experience” for all parties
and were particularly successful at employing defendants and reducing
recidivism.357
At this time, however, diversion programs “appear to be offered
relatively sparingly to individuals, and instead are used proportionally more
frequently to avoid the prosecution of corporations, their officers, and
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

See, e.g., Davis, supra note 172, at 1081 (2016).
28 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2).
Id.
United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2015).
S. REP. NO. 93-1021, at 36–37 (1974).
See VERA INST. OF JUST., THE MANHATTAN COURT EMPLOYMENT PROJECT OF THE VERA
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT NOVEMBER 1967 – DECEMBER 31, 1970, at 1 (1970), https://ww
w.vera.org/downloads/Publications/the-manhattan-court-employment-project-of-the-vera-institute-of-j
ustice-final-report-november-1967-december-31-1970/legacy_downloads/the-manhattan-court-employ
ment-project.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8JG-APTB].
357. Id.; see id. at 12 (“[S]upportive and rehabilitative services can significantly alter the
incidence of repeated criminal activity.”); see also ROBERTA ROVNER-PIECZENIK, NAT’L COMM. FOR
CHILDREN AND YOUTH, PROJECT CROSSROADS AS PRE-TRIAL INTERVENTION: A PROGRAM
EVALUATION
17
(1970),
available
at
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED113651.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CMT6-ZV4D] (concluding that the rate of recidivism to be the “most dramatic positive
finding related to the project’s legal ‘success’”); id. at 17-18 (“[T]here is little doubt that recidivism in .
. . [the] 15–month period following initial arrest was markedly lower for participants favorably
terminated from the project.”).
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employees.”358 Corporations responsible for the sale of defective products,
for example, are not typically prosecuted.359 The justification provided by
prosecutors is that there are broad concerns with collateral consequences if
corporations are criminally prosecuted, namely it could be bad for
shareholders and employees.360 But this rationale is even more compelling
when an individual offender is punished—there are severe collateral
consequences to both the family structure and community.361
Prosecutors have strayed significantly from Congress’s original intent.
The opioid crisis has provided a moment of introspection for many
prosecutors, and their response thus far is right: addiction should not be
criminalized and punished but instead treated through diversion programs.
This is the just outcome no matter the person’s race.
C. Liberation Justice: From Hip-Hop to Black Lives Matter
Hip-hop music empowered, enriched, and educated my mind. This
Article in many ways is me fulfilling my promise to myself that when I have
“one mic, one beat, and one stage,”362 I would use that platform to argue for
meaningful criminal justice transformation. I am reminded everyday—
through my own experiences and through others’—that, in the criminal
justice context, among others, we “need some soul searchin’, the time is
now.”363 For prosecutors, hip-hop provides a pathway to liberation justice
that establishes integrity and fairness in the criminal legal system. It does so
by “describ[ing], with eloquence, the problems with” American criminal
justice, “and articulat[ing], with passion, a better way.”364 This section is, as
hip-hop artist Nas states, my “One Mic.”
Liberation justice builds on the work of Amna A. Akbar, Sameer M.
Ashar, and Jocelyn Simonson on movement law.365 “Occupy, Black Lives
Matter, and the Standing Rock Water Protectors have reminded us of the
circular rather than linear nature of history, the ongoing centrality of
indigenous genocide and anti-Black violence—and the ongoing power of

358. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d at 23.
359. See supra note 64.
360. See Griffin, supra note 65, at 330 (citation omitted) (noting that deferred-prosecution
agreements were designed to “achieve[ ] a result that minimizes the collateral damage to shareholders
and employees”).
361. These unintended consequences are explored in verse in many hip-hop albums, see
discussion supra Section III.C.1.a.
362. See NAS, One Mic, on STILLMATIC (Columbia 2002).
363. Id.
364. Butler Article, supra note 67, at 987.
365. See Amna A. Akbar, Sameer M. Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 4) (on file) (“Movement law is not the study of social
movements; rather it is investigation and analysis with social movements.”).
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people’s resistance to shaping the country.”366 In Much Respect: Toward a
Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, Professor Paul Butler argued that hip-hop
music and culture can transform the way our criminal legal system thinks
about punishment.367 Movement law carries this a step further: rather than
merely acknowledging the experiences of marginalized communities
through their art, it calls on us to lend our efforts to their active resistance.368
Liberation justice, then, is a call to do both, and furthermore to contextualize
contemporary art and activism within the long struggle for freedom and
equality under the law.
In the past decade, calls to address systemic racism and instill respect for
the humanity and dignity of Black people have found new activist
expressions in the Movement for Black Lives. The Movement calls for
radical and revolutionary changes, including ending police militarization
against and surveillance of Black communities, pretrial detention and cash
bail, the death penalty, the carceral state, and the use of past criminal history
as a bar to full civil and social participation.369 These calls to action all stem
from a common understanding that the punitive burdens of our criminal
legal system are designed to fall disproportionately on Black, Brown, and
poor people. Prosecutors are well positioned to begin this liberationist
reimagining the criminal legal system by practicing empathy toward the
Black lives they encounter on a daily basis.
Section 1 will explore the perspectives from hip-hop and the Movement
for Black Lives that can inform prosecutors of the collateral consequences
of their actions. Section 2 will outline some of the avenues for change
available to prosecutors who embrace these liberation justice perspectives,
including the decriminalization of drugs, using their prosecutorial discretion
to nullify charges, removing the lingering penalties of a conviction
following the completion of a sentence, and eliminating cash bail. These,
along with the reforms explored from constitutionalist and originalist
perspectives above, provide a starting point for prosecutors who would
embrace liberation justice.

366. Id. (manuscript at 6).
367. Butler Article, supra note 67, at 986–87.
368. See LAW FOR BLACK LIVES, Movement Lawyering In Moments of Crisis, http://www.law4bl
acklives.org/respond [https://perma.cc/V3EN-KTFX] (“Movement lawyering means taking direction
from directly impacted communities and from organizers, as opposed to imposing our leadership or
expertise as legal advocates. It means building the power of the people, not the power of the law.”).
369. See Movement for Black Lives, End the War on Black People, M4BL (2020),
https://m4bl.org/end-the-war-on-black-people/ [https://perma.cc/26E6-344D].
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1. Perspectives on the System Inherent in the Problems
Prosecutors can learn much from the “Black CNN.”370 Hip-hop identifies
important problems in our criminal legal system with accuracy, passion, and
love. Hip-hop interrogates criminal justice through the mass incarceration
lens. It is there where obvious problems of race, power, and punishment
intersect in ways that raise profound questions of fairness. In recent years,
the Movement for Black Lives has centered its activism around such
questions, calling for fundamental changes in policing and punishment. A
prosecutor must be able to see these intersections and listen to the calls for
change in order to understand them and advance justice.
a. Hip-Hop Approaches to Justice as Fairness
The recognition that criminal justice favors—or, perhaps, protects—
whites, especially white elites, is prevalent in hip-hop music. The system
does this by turning a blind eye to white crime while over-policing and
locking up innocent Blacks. As an example, we need look no further than
the divergent police responses to the protests in the summer of 2020 after
Derek Chauvin, a police officer, brutally murdered George Floyd. Police
officers rammed protesters with cars, gassed them, kettled and arrested
them, and shot projectiles at them. By contrast, police turned a blind eye to
white vigilantes standing around with firearms and other weapons,
escalating the crisis.371
Kendrick Lamar’s album “Damn” captures in rhythmic dynamism
criminal justice’s oppression and unequal treatment of Black people. He
calls out how criminal justice’s “race barriers make inferior you and I”;372
its bias and inequality, stating, “It’s nasty when you set us up, then roll the
dice, then bet us up / You overnight the big rifles, then tell Fox to be scared
of us / Gang members or terrorists, et cetera, et cetera / America’s reflections
of me, that’s what a mirror does.”373 He also critiques its permission to kill
Blacks, predicting, “I’ll prolly die from one of these bats and blue badges /
Body slammed on black and white paint, my bones snappin’.”374 In the last
track, “Duckworth,” Kendrick—still hopeful—calls on criminal justice to

370. CHUCK D WITH YUSUF JAH, supra note 186, at 256.
371. Mark Johnson, Annysa Johnson & Talis Shelbourne, Kenosha Videos of Jacob Blake, Kyle
Rittenhouse Shootings Prompt Fierce Debate over Race and Justice, USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 2020, 1:20
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/08/29/kenosha-videos-show-differenceblake-rittenhouse-police-treatment/5667702002/ [https://perma.cc/5S3N-GR4K].
372. See KENDRICK LAMAR, Pride, on DAMN (Aftermath 2017).
373. See KENDRICK LAMAR FEATURING U2, XXX., on DAMN (Aftermath 2017).
374. See KENDRICK LAMAR, FEAR., on DAMN (Aftermath 2017).
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treat Black people with humanity: “Pay attention / That one decision
changed both of they lives, one curse at a time / Reverse the manifest.”375
Other hip-hop artists address how the criminal legal system is used to
protect white supremacy. Eminem, a prominent white hip-hop artist,
powerfully tackles race and law in his track “Untouchable.” There, he
focuses on white privilege and policing, rapping, from a police officer’s
perspective, “Black boy, black boy, we ain’t gonna lie to you / Black boy,
black boy, we don’t like the sight of you . . . / White boy, white boy, you’re
untouchable.” 376 He concludes arguing that America—and in particular
white Americans—have committed genocide by killing “its Natives” and
have publicly executed Blacks without punishment.377 Big L complains that
prosecutors “wanna lock me up even though I’m legit / They can’t stand to
see a young brother pockets thick.”378 Pep Love laments, “Even if we not
locked up, we on our way.”379 And, Jay-Z pleads, “I am not poison / Just a
boy from the hood that got my hands in the air / In despair don’t shoot / I
just wanna do good.” 380 Hip-hop exposes our criminal legal system by
stating what should be self-evident: no one should have confidence in a
criminal legal system in which the law—and the actors that enforce it—
punishes Blackness while blameworthy conduct by white people goes
unpunished.
The hip-hop community has given much thought to criminal punishment.
Its vision is intensely informed by empathy and compassion and braided in
love—criminals are not just criminals, but fathers, mothers, sons, and
daughters. We must experience people as more than the conduct that
brought them before the criminal legal system and understand that “each of
us is more than the worst thing we’ve ever done.”381 The Notorious B.I.G.’s
introduction to his massively successful autobiographical hit, “Juicy,”
encapsulates this idea of empathy in a very emotional and real way: “Yeah,
this album is dedicated to all the teachers that told me I’d never amount to
nothin’ / To all the people that lived above the buildings that I was hustlin’
/ In front of that called the police on me when I was just tryin’ / To make
some money to feed my daughter.”382 All this frames hip-hop’s vision of
crime and punishment.

375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
1998).
380.
381.
382.

See KENDRICK LAMAR, DUCKWORTH., on DAMN (Aftermath 2017).
See EMINEM, Untouchable, on REVIVAL (Aftermath 2017).
Id.
See BIG L, The Enemy, on THE BIG PICTURE (Rawkus 2000).
See HIEROGLYPHICS, All Things, on 3RD EYE VISION (Hieroglyphics Imperium Recordings
See JAY-Z, spiritual (RocNation 2016).
STEVENSON, supra note 229, at 17.
THE NOTORIOUS B.I.G., Juicy, on READY TO DIE (Bad Boys 1994).

684

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 99:627

Hip-hop embraces retributive justice, the idea that there are certain
crimes—specifically violent crimes—that deserve punishment. It is “the
unwritten law in rap,” according to Jay-Z, that “if you shoot my dog, I’ma
kill yo’ cat . . . know dat / For every action there’s a reaction.”383 Hip-hop
also offers, as Professor Paul Butler advanced, a utilitarian “remix”384 —
this appreciation that non-violent offenders, especially drug offenders,
should not be punished because any form of punishment is massively
outweighed by the harmful collateral consequences to the community. The
cost-benefit analysis of criminal conviction and punishment is a central
theme to hip-hop.
Collateral consequences are a life sentence of a different kind. Many
collateral consequences include, among others, denial of voting rights and
jury service, occupational licenses, public housing and public assistance,
employment discrimination, and ineligibility for personal, business, and
school loans. 385 All of this exacerbates existing challenges within Black
communities, including poverty and unemployment, while the risk of
recidivism increases. 386 In “Ghetto Gospel,” Tupac Shakur compared
collateral consequences to “another form of slavery.” 387 Erykah Badu in
“Otherside of the Game,” sings “What you gonna do when they come for
you / Work ain’t honest but it pays the bills / What we gonna do when they
come for you / God I can’t stand life withoutcha.” 388 Both samples
underscore that while prosecutors often decline to hold corporations or
executives accountable for serious crimes because of the potential collateral
consequences to innocent third parties, they should also take innocent thirdparty interests into account for individual crimes. To provide legitimacy to
criminal law, hip-hop suggests that these same considerations—individual
and community collateral effects—must be applied to Black
communities. 389 Prosecutors can address these collateral effects through
diversion programs 390 and post-conviction relief 391 while continuously
informing their routine decisionmaking.

383. JAY-Z, Justify My Thug, on THE BLACK ALBUM (Roc-A-Fella 2003).
384. Butler Article, supra note 67, at 984.
385. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues
of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 461–69 (2010).
386. Id.
387. 2PAC, Ghetto Gospel, on LOYAL TO THE GAME (Amaru Entertainment & Interscope 2004).
388. ERYKAH BADU, Otherside of the Game, on BADUIZM (Kedar Records 1997).
389. See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1384
(2002) (arguing that “[m]itigating third-party interests . . . is necessary to maintain the legitimacy of
criminal law, even as conflicting commitments to distributive fairness, retributive justice, and crime
prevention necessitate some punishment.”).
390. See supra Section III.B.2.
391. Discussed supra Section III.A.3. and infra Section III.C.2.c.
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b. The Movement for Black Lives
The Movement for Black Lives, in many ways, has undertaken
reimagining our criminal legal system as something more. In her brilliant
article Toward A Radical Imagination of Law, Professor Amna Akbar
examines how The Movement is “working to build another state—another
world even—organized differently than the one we have inherited. They are
aiming to use the law as a tool to build that alternative future.” 392 The
Movement advances a decarceral, abolitionist agenda with a demand to
“End to the War against Black People[, specifically,] the criminalization,
incarceration, and killing of our people.”393 The Movement proffers many
revolutionary and radical solutions to end racist regimes and structures that
perpetuate this war on Black people. This “grand vision” provides much
thought on several issues—including policing—that prosecutors can learn
from.394
Black people are being killed by police. In such situations, The
Movement demands that prosecutors prosecute the cops the way that they
have prosecuted Blacks. 395 This demand, as Akbar notes,
demonstrates the lawlessness with which the police act—while demanding
Black compliance.396 The Movement understands that police violence is a
consequence of the erosion of Black civil liberties—police can and do
racially profile and conduct pretextual stops. Prosecutors can—and
should—do more to end these practices, including exercising their
discretion to either not bring charges against the victim of such practices,
exclude tainted evidence, and/or prosecute the police officer for civil rights
violations.397 This, however, raises a larger question in The Movement—
should policing be abolished? I previously argued that reform alone is
insufficient and that the racist aspects of policing must be abolished:

392. Amna A. Akbar, Toward A Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 412 (2018).
393. See Movement for Black Lives, Vision for Black Lives, M4BL (2020), https://m4bl.org/polic
y-platforms/ [https://perma.cc/NP4U-NSV8].
394. Akbar, supra note 392, at 412.
395. See, e.g., Louisiana Protesters Demand Prosecution of Police in Fatal Shooting, WIS.
GAZETTE (July 7, 2016), http://www.wisconsingazette.com/news/louisiana-protesters-demandprosecution-of-police-in-fatal-shooting/article_42a4c289-e45a-5bae-be76-cc8fed9a7fe8.html
[https://perma.cc/XFK8-H VBG]; Greg Moore, Protesters Call for Prosecution of Police in Fatal
Shooting, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 21, 2015, 9:27 AM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/nationworld/national/article45795855.html [https://perma.cc/7Y3H-4UQ6]; Jane Morice, Tamir Rice’s
Mother Continues to Demand Justice Two Years After Son’s Fatal Shooting by Cleveland Police,
CLEVELAND.COM
(Nov.
23,
2016),
http://www.cleveland.
com/metro/index.ssf/2016/11/tamir_rices_mother_continues_t.html [https://perma.cc/UNE7-22M7].
396. Akbar, supra note 392, at 467.
397. See supra Section III.A.2.
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[T]o date, progressive police reform measures have simply not
worked. One frequently suggested remedy is reform in police hiring,
focusing on local citizens so that the composition of police
departments accurately reflects their cities’ populations. Yet even in
cities with police forces that are more representative of their
populations’ racial diversity, the problem of police violence
continues, in part because of fundamental failings of even
“community policing” reforms. The Minneapolis Police Department
embraced and implemented progressive police reforms—from
community policing and diversity, to implicit bias and de-escalation
trainings, to bans on “warrior style” policing, among other things—
and still George Floyd was murdered.398
This point is important—racialized police cannot police effectively
because they ignore—or actively harm—Black communities. This in turn
means that some communities cannot rely on the police, even in a crisis,
because they fear the consequences. Asking whether to abolish the police,
despite disagreements, leads to important conversations about the role of
police in mass incarceration. 399 Prosecutors must be actively engaged in
these necessary conversations.
2. Practical Applications
It is no secret that many Americans—and especially Black Americans—
have been frustrated with every aspect of our criminal legal system, from
policing through imprisonment. Not only does the hip-hop nation express
itself through words, but they and the Movement are on the frontlines
advocating for change. Hip-hop artists and Black Lives Matter activists
have been working the streets, meeting with both United States and state
legislators, and touring prisons to find solutions to dire criminal justice
problems. Many have created or joined movements with the express goal of
reforming the way criminal justice is administered in the United States. For
example, Meek Mill and Jay-Z created the REFORM Alliance in hopes to
leverage “our considerable resources to change laws [and] policies” that will
“dramatically reduce the number of people who are unjustly under the
control of the criminal justice system.”400 Common has toured prisons and
398. Hasbrouck, supra note 236, at 1122–24; see also Mychal Denzel Smith, Abolish the Police.
Instead, Let’s Have Full Social, Economic, and Political Equality, NATION (Apr. 9, 2015),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/abolish-police-instead-lets-have-full-social-economic-andpolitical-equali ty/ [https://perma.cc/MKX3-JL4F] (“What use do I have for an institution that routinely
kills people who look like me, and make it so I’m afraid to walk out of my home?”).
399. Akbar, supra note 392, at 471.
400. Mission
Statement,
REFORM
ALLIANCE,
https://reformalliance.com/
[https://perma.cc/9R6M-LCP6].
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hosted community concerts alongside J. Cole to campaign for criminal
justice reform. 401 And, Kanye West, among others, lobbied President
Donald Trump to pass The First Step Act, a federal sentencing and prison
reform bill. 402 All of these efforts are viewed as necessary to end mass
incarceration—the civil and human rights crisis of our time.
But more must be done—and prosecutors are at the center. This section
briefly explores several solutions that prosecutors committed to liberation
justice can implement, including: decriminalization of non-violent drug
offenses; nullification; restoration of rights through expungement; and
eliminating bail and pretrial detention.
a. Decriminalization of Drugs
The hip-hop community acknowledges the harmful consequences that
some drugs have for individuals and communities.403 Hip-hop culture “is
not as quick as some scholars to label drug crimes ‘victimless.’”404 Still, hiphop makes the basic claim for the decriminalization of drug offenses. The
“war on drugs” has taken a nightmarish toll on Black communities with
limited, if any, value in exchange.405 For this reason, members of the hiphop community have called for the decriminalization of drugs, arguing for
the reinvestment of any resulting savings and revenue into reparations,
restorative services, mental health services, job programs, and other
programs supporting those impacted by the “war on drugs.” 406 These
benefits of decriminalization cannot be overstated. Most immediately, the
prison population, especially Black populations, would be greatly
reduced. 407 Several states have started this process by decriminalizing
401. Nerisha Penrose, Common to Host Free Community Concert with J. Cole & More to
Advocate for Criminal Justice Reform, BILLBOARD.COM (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/a
rticles/columns/hip-hop/7905216/common-j-cole-free-community-concert-sacramento-justice-reform
[https://perma.cc/9XPK-S69H].
402. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222.
403. See, e.g., ICE CUBE, Us, on DEATH CERTIFICATE (Lench Mob 1991) (“And all y’all dopedealers . . . You’re as bad as the po-lice cause ya kill us.”).
404. BUTLER BOOK, supra note 21, at 142.
405. Epps, supra note 216, at 828.
406. See, e.g., Movement for Black Lives, Invest-Divest Platform, M4BL,
https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms/invest-divest/ [https://perma.cc/R7C5-7DMM]; Killer Mike Says
Rappers Deserve Credit for Decriminalization of Marijuana, VIBE (June 18, 2019, 6:15 PM),
https://www.vibe.com/2019/06/killer-mike-says-rappers-deserve-credit-decriminalization-marijuanawee d [https://perma.cc/G8VC-W3CJ].
407. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Impunity: Sexual Abuse in Women’s Prisons, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 45, 52–53 (2007); Marne L. Lenox, Neutralizing the Gendered Collateral Consequences of the
War on Drugs, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 280, 284 (2011); see also Wilbert L. Cooper and Christie Thompson,
Will Drug Legalization Leave Black People Behind?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 11, 2020; 1:40 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/11/11/will-drug-legalization-leave-black-people-behind
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marijuana possession, noting that this change will help combat gross racial
disparities.408 Prosecutors should support decriminalization policies. Until
decriminalization laws are passed, prosecutors have the ability to (and
should) create diversion programs as a quasi-decriminalization measure or
even effectively nullify unjust laws.409
b. Prosecutorial Nullification
Hip-hop culture has not only shined a light on unequal treatment in the
criminal legal system, but has also encouraged people to fight unjust laws.410
For prosecutors, this can be accomplished by nullifying unjust criminal
laws, which will help combat our racist criminal legal system. 411 As
Professor Roger Fairfax explained, ”prosecutorial nullification [occurs
when] a prosecutor has sufficient evidence to secure a conviction against a
defendant for conduct that violates a criminal law, but declines prosecution
because of a disagreement with the law or [because prosecution] would be
unwise or unfair.412 In other words, prosecutors can—and occasionally do—
decline to charge a person “due to fundamental disagreement with
substantive law or discomfort with the severity of the likely penalty.”413
Prosecutors should not defend or enforce laws that are discriminatory.414
In 2014, then-Attorney General Eric Holder issued a statement in response
to same-sex marriage bans, arguing that state attorneys general are not

[https://perma.cc/WR3J-2AKV] (“Activists in Oregon pointed to a statewide study that found drug
convictions for Black and Native people would drop by nearly 95 percent under the state’s
decriminalization law.”).
408. States
That
Have
Decriminalized,
NORML
(2017),
http://norml.org/aboutmarijuana/item/states-that-have-decriminalized [https://perma.cc/5LW7-9WDF];
Sophie Quinton, In These States, Past Marijuana Crimes Can Go Away, HUFF. POST (Nov. 20, 2017,
10:09 AM ET), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/in-these-states-past-marijuana-crimes-can -goawayus5a12e8e8e4b023121e0e94e3 [https://perma.cc/DV4D-CFZ2].
409. See supra Section III.B.2.
410. See, e.g., VERNON REID, PHAROAHE MONCH, IMMORTAL TECHNIQUE, W.A.R., on W.A.R.
(WE ARE RENEGADES) (W.A.R. Media 2011) (“We are renegades. This means W.A.R. 16s bust to break
unjust laws.”).
411. Prosecutors clearly understand how to use their discretion to nullify laws when it comes to
prosecuting police. Hasbrouck, supra note 236, at 1128 (arguing that Congress should create a section
of the Department of Justice specifically to prosecute civil rights violations by police to avoid
discretionary decisions not to charge by local federal prosecutors); Mark Joseph Stern, The Police Lie.
All the Time. Can Anything Stop Them?, SLATE (Aug. 4, 2020, 11:51 AM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2020/08/police-testilying.html [https://perma.cc/KXQ6-X9D8] (“Prosecutors rely on officer
testimony, true or not, to secure convictions, and merely acknowledging the problem would require the
government to admit that there is almost never real punishment for police perjury.”).
412. See Fairfax, Jr., supra note 71, at 1252–54.
413. Epps, supra note 216, at 778.
414. Matt Apuzzo, Holder Sees Way to Curb Bans on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/us/holder-says-state-attorneys-general-dont-have-to-defend-gaymarriage-bans.html?ref=us&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ERN6-KC2R].
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obligated to defend laws that they believe are discriminatory.415 Attorney
General Holder contended that discriminatory laws raise constitutional
equal protection concerns, and, in such situations, prosecutors should apply
the highest level of scrutiny before they enforce or defend those laws.
Prosecutors should apply these same concerns to our criminal legal
system.416
When laws discriminate based on race or when the collateral
consequences to the individual and community are unfair, prosecutors
should engage in nullification. This will likely include many misdemeanors,
such as marijuana possession, fistfights, public drinking, and traffic
infractions. These types of crimes are the majority of what Black people are
arrested for, which induct us into the criminal legal system.417
c. Expungement and Restoration of Rights
Hip-hop culture understands that racial animus played a major role in
collateral consequence policies, such as felony disenfranchisement and
welfare and public benefit restrictions tied to drug offences. 418
Unsurprisingly then, these laws disproportionately impact Black people.419
Hip-hop has responded by creating organizations to lobby state legislatures
to change collateral consequence policies and expungement laws.420 There
has been much resistance to change, however, as many “prosecutors and
judges remain skeptical or outright opposed to record clearing.
Philosophically they don’t think those who’ve broken the law should get a
clean slate.”421
Collateral consequences—especially the criminal record—can result
from almost any contact with the criminal legal system, including
nonconvictions and dropped charges. Even these collateral consequences
fall within prosecutors’ influence. State legislatures have empowered
prosecutors to wield “remarkable influence over the procedural and

415. Id.
416. See supra Section III.A.1.
417. BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD, supra note 53, at 65.
418. Pinard, supra note 385, at 470–71.
419. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Malone, 366 A.2d 584, 587–88 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976)
(“Economic losses themselves may be both direct and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employment,
or professional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent as a consequence of the mere fact of an arrest,
even if followed by acquittal or complete exoneration of the charges involved.”).
420. See, e.g., Movement for Black Lives, supra note 406.
421. Eric Westervelt, Scrubbing the Past to Give Those with a Criminal Record a Second Chance,
NPR (Feb. 19, 2019, 4:58 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/19/692322738/scrubbin g-the-past-togive-those-with-a-criminal-record-a-second-chance [https://perma.cc/XPA5-RDTK].
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substantive aspects of expungement law.”422 A prosecutor’s decision to join
a petitioner’s motion to expunge or not object to such motion, in many
states, can result in automatic expungement of any non-violent
conviction. 423 Some state laws even mandate expungement when the
prosecutor consents to or does not object to the expungement motion.424 In
a criminal legal system designed to punish Blackness—which has
accomplished this goal with surgical precision—expungement matters.
Prosecutors have a significant role to play in its availability as a remedy for
people, especially Black people, struggling to overcome racist barriers after
their formal punishment has long ended.
d. Eliminating Cash Bail
Sandra Bland died in jail before her relatives could pay her $500 bond.425
Kalief Browder spent three years in Rikers when he was unable to pay
$3000 bail, resisting multiple attempts by prosecutors to plead guilty to the
charge of stealing a backpack in exchange for his release. 426 While their
tragic deaths are extreme examples of the collateral consequences of the
decision to request cash bail, their detention is typical in America, where
hundreds of thousands of people are held in jail because they cannot make
bail.427 “Bail amounts of $5000, $1000, and sometimes even sums as low as
$250 or $100, routinely stand in the way of a person’s freedom.”428 While
422. Brian M. Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters?: Prosecutorial Discretion and Expungement,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2846 (2018). Murray’s Article provides an excellent survey of all state
expungement laws.
423. See id. at 2846–51 (collecting states).
424. Id. at 2848; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a) (stating that “concurrence of the
prosecuting attorney” requires the arresting agency to seal arrest records); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72705(1)(d)(II), (e)(II) (mandating expungement of various grades of misdemeanor convictions when the
prosecutor does not object); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(2) (noting that for pre-2013 arrests, “if record
restriction is approved by the prosecuting attorney, the arresting law enforcement agency shall restrict
the criminal history record information”); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/5.2(d)(6)(B) (providing for
automatic expungement if no objection); IOWA CODE ANN. § 901C.1 (providing for automatic
expungement upon no objection or initiation by a prosecutor, which is allowed under the statute); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.076(3) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.025(a) (providing for automatic
expungement unless the court finds it contrary to the public interest); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
160.50(1); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 7602(a)(3); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-1401(c), 7-13-1501(f), 713-1502(f).
425. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Sandra Bland’s Family Cites ‘Plethora of Questions,’ Files Suit over
Her Death in Texas Jail, L.A. TIMES, (Aug. 4, 2015, 6:31 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-nasandra-bland-lawsuit-20150804-story.html [https://perma.cc/K4N9-2CXR].
426. Alysia Santo, No Bail, Less Hope: The Death of Kalief Browder, MARSHALL PROJECT (June
9, 2015, 6:04 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/09/no-bail-less-hope-the-death-of-kali
ef-browder [https://perma.cc/KH7Y-2ARG].
427. Id.
428. Insha Rahman, Undoing the Bail Myth: Pretrial Reforms to End Mass Incarceration, 46
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 845, 847 (2019); see also THE FAT BOYS, Jail House Rap, on FAT BOYS (Sutra
Records 1984) (“And the next thing you know I was headed upstate / In jail, in jail, without no bail.”).
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judges set bail, the decision to do so typically originates with prosecutors,
often with severe evidentiary advantages over defendants in bail
proceedings.429 It should come as no surprise that cash bail is one of the
primary targets of Larry Krasner and other “progressive prosecutors.”430 As
Browder’s case demonstrates, bail is often one of the prosecutor’s primary
tools in plea bargaining, driving convictions not on the basis of actual guilt,
but on an imprisoned defendant’s desire to be set free.431
Forgoing the request for cash bail would force prosecutors to plea
bargain in good faith based on the merits of their case against the defendant
rather than use the coercion of ongoing imprisonment to secure quick
convictions. The coercive strength of cash bail is rooted in the collateral
consequences of pretrial detention—defendants who cannot make bail risk
losing their jobs, housing, and even custody of their children.432 “[I]f bail is
set in an amount higher than a defendant can pay, that defendant is
incentivized to plead guilty early in the process, without the benefit of
extended discussions with counsel, case investigation, or discovery from the
prosecution.”433 Defendants held in pretrial detention experience difficulty
in obtaining private counsel and assisting in their own defense.434 While
these circumstances have become typical, they undermine the purpose of
the right to bail: protecting the pretrial liberty of defendants in all but the
most serious cases. 435 The practice of setting bail that prevents pretrial
release as a tool for adversarial advantage, then, is not merely cruel, but
violates the purpose of constitutionally protecting pretrial liberty and the
429. Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth
Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1354–55 (2012) (“When the defense lacks knowledge of
the evidence against him, the defendant cannot properly challenge the detention request, meaningfully
participate in the hearing, or refute any secret evidence because the proceeding is one-sided.”); see also
2PAC, Out on Bail, on LOYAL TO THE GAME (Amaru Entertainment & Interscope Records 2004) (“I’m
stuck in jail, the D.A.’s tryin’ to burn me / I’d be out on bail, if I had a good attorney.”).
430. See Abbe Smith, Good Person, Good Prosecutor in 2018, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 3,
4 (2018).
431. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464,
2468 (2004) (“The vast majority of criminal cases are small ones, in which defendants face only modest
amounts of jail time. If a defendant is denied or cannot make bail, the length of pretrial detention may
approach or even dwarf the likely sentence after trial. Thus, detained defendants strike bargains for time
served instead of awaiting their day in court. Plea bargaining, then, often happens in the shadow not of
trial but of bail decisions.”).
432. See Ashli Giles-Perkins, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: Holding Cash Bail
Unconstitutional, 25 PUB. INT. L. REP. 102, 103 (2020) (“People with money to bail themselves out can
get back to their lives and fight their case from the outside, while those too poor to post bail may lose
their jobs, housing and even custody of their children as they wait.”).
433. Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 589 (2017).
434. See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 555
(2012); Amy McCrossen, Note, Bailout: Leaving Behind Pennsylvania’s Monetary Bail System, 57
DUQ. L. REV. 415, 430 (2019).
435. See Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ.
L. REV. 909, 947–48 (2013) (presenting an originalist defense of a fundamental right to bail as a
protection of pretrial liberty resting on “sufficient sureties”).
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right to a fair trial. A prosecutor informed by liberation justice should—at a
minimum—forgo bail in all nonviolent cases.
*

*

*

There is much common ground in seemingly disparate threads of theory.
These overlaps provide a construction of a prosecutor that is solely
concerned with doing justice. It is in these spaces that justice is painted—
not in definitional words—but in concrete actions. These actions lie entirely
within the power of modern prosecutors, if they choose to embrace them. If
they do not, then perhaps they could be motivated by the elimination of
absolute prosecutorial immunity 436 —a change which could be
accomplished by the same Congressional power I previously applied to
policing in Abolishing Racist Policing With the Thirteenth Amendment.437
All of the solutions proposed in this Article find support in each theory—
from establishing constitutional norms to strengthening civil liberties; from
decriminalizing—in policy or action—non-violent drug offenses to
nullifying discriminatory laws and eliminating cash bail; and from
expungement to post-conviction relief. Most importantly, perhaps, there is
support in each theory that justice requires Black lives to matter.
CONCLUSION
I feel my ancestors unrested inside of me. It’s like they want me to shoot
my chance in changing society.438
–Joey Bada$$
This Article is my chance to change the way the United States
administers criminal justice. It reimagines our criminal legal system with
prosecutors who are single mindedly focused on ensuring that justice is
done. The vision of justice shared in this Article is informed by and
committed to abolition constitutionalism, critical originalism, and liberation
justice principles. And, that vision, I hope, has the potential to profoundly
reshape criminal justice. It not only identifies important problems in our
criminal legal system but builds bridges across the ideological spectrum
toward necessary solutions. This Article is a pathway forward—the
blueprint for prosecutors to begin to address the extraordinary racial and
436. See Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV.
53, 57 (“The reconsideration of absolute prosecutorial immunity is especially urgent for two reasons:
(1) recent empirical studies establish that prosecutorial misconduct is a significant factor contributing to
numerous wrongful convictions of innocent people; and (2) emerging circuit splits on the application of
the absolute prosecutorial immunity doctrine suggest that it is becoming increasingly unworkable and is
in fact undermining the goals it was designed to achieve.”).
437. Hasbrouck, supra note 236, at 1108.
438. JOEY BADA$$, Land of the Free, on ALL-AMERIKKKAN BADA$$ (Pro Era 2017).
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economic disparities in our system. Much can and should be done by the
prosecutor and justice demands so. We cannot rest in the struggle to bring
justice to the criminal legal system but must be prepared to face fantastic
resistance to our efforts.439

439. See James Baldwin, A Talk to Teachers, SATURDAY REV. (Dec. 21, 1963), https://richgibson.
com/talktoteachers.htm [https://perma.cc/5U52-XGXQ] (“[I]n the attempt to correct so many
generations of bad faith and cruelty . . . you will meet the most fantastic, the most brutal, and the most
determined resistance.”).

